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INTRODUCTIONIN Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, the Supreme
Court reached the unsurprising conclusion that national security
is more important than whale watching.' What is surprising and
should be deeply troubling is that the Court thought its job was to
choose between the two. Winter arose when environmental groups
sought an injunction to stop the Navy from using a mid-frequency
sonar system in training exercises, arguing that this type of sonar
harms whales and that the National Environmental Policy Act
("NEPA") requires the Navy to study the environmental impacts
of the sonar system before using it.2 The President, however, de-
clared that emergency circumstances warranted relaxing NEPA's
requirements.' The environmental plaintiffs countered that NEPA
'Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 365, 382 (2008).
2 Id. at 366-67.
'Brief for the Petitioners at 14-15, Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129 S.
Ct. 365 (2008) (No. 07-1239).
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contains no exception for emergencies. As the case was presented
to the Supreme Court, Winter posed a straightforward question of
statutory interpretation: whether NEPA authorizes the President
to exempt military activities from the requirement to issue an envi-
ronmental impact statement.' The Court did not reach that ques-
tion, however, ruling instead that the balance of equities would not
support an injunction even if the Navy were in violation of NEPA.
For several decades the Court has held that violations of federal
statutes can be enjoined only if an injunction is supported by the
balance of equities, a test also known as the "balance of hard-
ships," the "balance of interests," and the "balance of conven-
iences."' When courts balance the equities, they compare the hard-
ship the plaintiff would face if an injunction were denied against
the hardship the defendant would face if an injunction were
granted.! In 1982, the Court established a presumption that statutes
authorizing equitable relief should be read to call for equitable
balancing, which the Court has declared to be an ancient judicial
practice: "We are dealing here with the requirements of equity
practice with a background of several hundred years of history."'
As the Court understood the competing interests in Winter, the
most serious harm that the plaintiffs might suffer from the denial of
Brief for the Respondents at 30-35, Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 129
S. Ct. 365 (2008) (No. 07-1239).
sId.; Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 3, at 21-34.
6 The balance of equities is one of four factors in the familiar test for obtaining an
injunction, under which a plaintiff must demonstrate
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law,
such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3)
that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant,
a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be
disserved by a permanent injunction.
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
'See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987) (stating that the
balance of equities requires that a court "must balance the competing claims of injury
and must consider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the re-
quested relief"). Although the standards for preliminary and permanent injunctive
relief differ slightly, both require equitable balancing. See id. at 546 n.12. As a result,
this Article addresses both preliminary and permanent injunctive relief equally and
does not distinguish between the two.
'Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944); see also Weinberger v. Romero-
Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311, 320 (1982) (discussing the "traditional balancing of the
parties' competing interests" and declaring that "a major departure from the long tra-
dition of equity practice should not be lightly implied").
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an injunction was that the sonar might hurt whales, which in turn
might prevent the plaintiffs from going whale watching and making
nature documentaries.! In contrast, an injunction might prevent the
Navy from adequately training sailors in antisubmarine warfare,
which could gravely undermine national security."o Seen this way,
Winter is an easy case, pitting trivial recreational interests against
the paramount needs of national security, and the Court did not
hesitate to declare that the balance "does not strike us as a close
question.""
This Article argues that the Court's experiment over the last
several decades in applying equitable balancing in statutory cases
should be abandoned because it conflicts with separation of powers
principles. As Part I shows, the premise for applying equitable bal-
ancing in statutory cases-that equitable balancing is a longstand-
ing factor for deciding whether to issue injunctions-is simply un-
true. Balancing the equities is not a dusty doctrine discussed by
Lord Edward Coke or set forth in the Commentaries of Sir William
Blackstone or laid down by the Framers as a foundation of the Re-
public. Balancing the equities is a demonstrably modern practice. It
first developed during the period of rapid industrialization follow-
ing the Civil War, when some state courts sought a mechanism to
protect industrial interests from injunctions in common law nui-
sance actions challenging air and water pollution. The courts that
first developed equitable balancing presented it as an ancient prac-
tice, thereby justifying an expansion of judicial discretion to protect
judicially favored policy interests, which in that era included a
preference for industrial interests over the interests of small prop-
erty owners. History is repeating itself because, in expanding the
application of equitable balancing from the common law context in
which it developed to the contexts of federal statutes, the Supreme
Court has once again justified an expansion of judicial discretion
by making the false claim that equitable balancing is an ancient ju-
dicial practice.
'The plaintiffs included members of the Natural Resources Defense Council who
enjoyed whale watching and nature documentarian Jean-Michel Cousteau, son of
famed oceanographer Jacques Cousteau. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 371.
'
0 Id. at 377-78.
" Id. at 378.
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Part II argues that the mistaken notion that the issuance of in-
junctions has always depended on a balance of equities serves to
obscure substantial separation-of-powers problems raised when
courts balance the equities in statutory contexts. As Justice Felix
Frankfurter observed, "'[b]alancing the equities' when considering
whether an injunction should issue, is lawyers' jargon for choosing
between conflicting public interests."12 Although the Court may be-
lieve that equitable balancing is simply what courts deciding injunc-
tions have always done, the application of equitable balancing in
statutory cases like Winter is remarkably new, and it serves to ag-
grandize judicial power by authorizing judges to resolve cases by
comparing the relative importance of policies established by the
political branches. Winter portrays the balance of equities as in-
volving merely a comparison of the parties' interests, but those in-
terests arise out of competing federal policies. On the one hand,
the President, acting under both his constitutional and statutory
authority, directed the Secretary of the Navy to provide adequate
training for sailors." On the other hand, Congress directed federal
agencies to consider the potential environmental impacts of pro-
posed actions.14 Balancing the equities in Winter and other cases
arising out of competing federal policies allows, if not requires, that
judges pick which federal policy they consider most important, a
task that is inconsistent with separation-of-powers principles.
As Part III argues, the Court does not need to develop an alter-
native to equitable balancing in statutory cases because it already
has one. The Court has developed a set of principles for resolving
apparent conflicts between statutes, and these principles establish
neutral criteria for determining whether statutes can be reconciled
and, if not, which statutory command should prevail." When faced
" Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 609-10 (1952) (Frank-
furter, J., concurring).
" See 10 U.S.C. § 5062(a) (2006) (directing that the Navy "shall be organized,
trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to opera-
tions at sea"); 10 U.S.C. § 5062(d) (2006) (directing that "[tihe Navy shall develop air-
craft, weapons, tactics, technique, organization, and equipment of naval combat and
service elements").
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006).
5 See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974) ("[W]hen two statutes are capa-
ble of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, absent a clearly expressed congres-
sional intention to the contrary, to regard each as effective."); see also Watt v. Alaska,
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with competing federal policy commands, like the conflict in Win-
ter between the obligation to train sailors and to analyze the envi-
ronmental impacts of proposed federal actions, courts should em-
ploy traditional tools of statutory construction to determine how
Congress intended these competing policy commands to be recon-
ciled. In contrast to equitable balancing, the principles for address-
ing apparent conflicts between statutes are straightforward, rela-
tively neutral, and fairly mechanical, and they do not involve ad
hoc judicial policymaking. As the Court has declared, when faced
with apparently conflicting statutes, "courts are not at liberty to
pick and choose among congressional enactments."16 Yet choosing
between conflicting statutory policies is exactly what the Court did
in Winter and what equitable balancing requires.
I. THE SUPRISINGLY SHORT HISTORY OF EQUITABLE BALANCING
The development of equitable balancing illustrates the legal real-
ist insight that judicial policy choices are often disguised as the in-
evitable application of longstanding principles." Since 1982, the
Supreme Court has held that federal courts can enjoin violations of
federal statutes only if the balance of equities supports an injunc-
tion." As the Court has repeatedly intoned, federal statutes author-
izing injunctive relief should be read to require equitable balancing
because "a major departure from the long tradition of equity prac-
tice should not be lightly implied."19 As Section A demonstrates,
equitable balancing is far from the ancient practice described by
451 U.S. 259, 267 (1981) (asserting that the courts should read federal statutes "to give
effect to each if we can do so while preserving their sense and purpose").
16 Mancari, 417 U.S. at 551.
" See Frederick Schauer, Defining Originalism, 19 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 343, 345-
46 (1996) ("[O]ne of the lessons of legal realism is a continuing skepticism about the
tendency of legal actors, lawyers, judges, and legal scholars to disguise in the language
of necessity what are in fact political, social, moral, economic, philosophical, or policy
choices."); see also Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 172-81
(1982) (discussing when subterfuges are preferable to candor); Roscoe Pound, Law in
Books and Law in Action, 44 Am. L. Rev. 12, 12-15 (1910) (discussing the use of fic-
tions in the common law, such as changing the meaning of terms rather than conced-
in that the rules had changed).
See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312, 320 (1982); infra notes
102-13 and accompanying text.
" Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 320; see also eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547
U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
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the Court. The doctrine was not applied by English equity courts
and is not discussed in any of the classic treatises on equity jurisdic-
tion. It made its first appearance in 1868.20 The early cases adopting
equitable balancing reveal that the doctrine developed for a spe-
cific reason: to expand judicial discretion to protect industrial de-
fendants against injunctions in nuisance actions brought by prop-
erty owners complaining of pollution. Judges believed that the
harms from closing down factories generally outweighed the harms
from allowing pollution to continue, and they fashioned equitable
balancing as a doctrine to allow them to compare these costs. The
courts that adopted equitable balancing pronounced it to be a
longstanding judicial practice, but in fact there was no history of
courts deciding whether to issue injunctions based on a comparison
of costs and benefits. As Section B shows, the Supreme Court's late
twentieth-century adoption of equitable balancing in statutory con-
texts followed a similar history. Like the nineteenth-century courts,
the Supreme Court validated the adoption of balancing in deciding
whether to enjoin violations of federal statutes on the ground that
the doctrine was ancient, once again justifying an expansion of ju-
dicial discretion to determine whether injunctions are consistent
with the Court's own assessments of competing policy interests.
A. The Recent Creation of the Ancient Doctrine of Equitable
Balancing
As Professor Alex Aleinikoff has argued, the ubiquity of balanc-
ing tests in contemporary constitutional law has made it difficult to
recognize that balancing is a modern phenomenon that repre-
sented a sharp break from the past and was highly controversial at
its inception." The same is true with regard to equitable balancing.
As this Section shows, reports of the ancient birth of equitable bal-
ancing are greatly exaggerated.
20 Richard's Appeal, 57 Pa. 105, 113-14 (1868); see infra notes 42-48 and accompa-
nying text.
I See T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Constitutional Law in the Age of Balancing, 96 Yale
L.J. 943, 943-45 (1987).
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1. The Non-Balancing Past
Equitable balancing is a late nineteenth-century creation.22 Eng-
lish and American courts in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and early
nineteenth centuries neither spoke of balancing the equities nor
employed a balancing approach in deciding whether to grant in-
junctions. No mention of equitable balancing appears in any trea-
tise on equity published during these eras. Although Lord Edward
Coke, Sir William Blackstone, and Joseph Story discussed the
availability of injunctions to restrain nuisances, trespasses, and
other torts, among other causes of action, none of them suggested
that courts of equity should undertake to balance the parties' com-
peting interests before granting an injunction. 23 Nor is balancing
mentioned in the treatises on equity and injunctions by Henry
Maddock (1815), Robert Henley Eden (1822), or James Holcombe
(1846).24
Of course, judicial balancing of competing interests in deciding
whether to grant injunctions did not appear out of nowhere. Before
courts began to balance the equities, they enjoyed considerable
22 See Peter Charles Hoffer, The Law's Conscience: Equitable Constitutionalism in
America 152 (1990) (concluding that the first American case applying equitable bal-
ancing is Richard's Appeal); Robert G. Bone, Normative Theory and Legal Doctrine
in American Nuisance Law: 1850 to 1920, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1101, 1159-60, 1178-79 &
nn.191-93 (1986) (discussing the history of balancing in American nuisance law); John
Leubsdorf, The Standard for Preliminary Injunctions, 91 Harv. L. Rev. 525, 534 n.58
(1978) (concluding that the balance of equities doctrine developed in British courts in
the early nineteenth century for use in preliminary injunctions and was applied to
permanent injunctions only at the end of the nineteenth century); see also Noga
Morag-Levine, Chasing the Wind: Regulating Air Pollution in the Common Law
State 86-102 (2003) (discussing the adoption of balancing by the Pennsylvania Su-
preme Court). But see George P. Smith II, Nuisance Law: The Morphogenesis of an
Historical Revisionist Theory of Contemporary Economic Jurisprudence, 74 Neb. L.
Rev. 658, 664, 690 (1995) (recognizing that Richard's Appeal is the first case employ-
ing equitable balancing but nonetheless maintaining that balancing "is to be found as
an inherent part of the analytical process in all legal decisionmaking").
2 1 Edward Coke, Institutes of the Laws of England 24 (13th ed. 1788); 3 William
Blackstone, Commentaries *201-06 (discussing ejectment, the injunctive remedy for
trespass); id. at *220-22 (discussing injunction for nuisance); Joseph Story, Commen-
taries on Equity Pleadings (Boston, Little and Brown 6th ed. 1857).
24 1 Henry Maddock, A Treatise on the Principles and Practice of the High Court of
Chancery (New York, Clayton and Kingsland 1817); Robert Henley Eden, A Treatise
on the Law of Injunctions (London, J. Butterworth 1821); James P. Holcombe, An
Introduction to Equity Jurisprudence (Cincinnati, Derby, Bradley & Co. 1846).
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discretion to decide whether to grant equitable relief.25 It was well-
established that a defendant's liability did not make automatic the
issuance of an injunction, which could be denied for a variety of
reasons unrelated to the merits of a plaintiff's case, including the
availability of adequate relief at law, unclean hands, laches, and
various forms of estoppel.26 These doctrines gave courts discretion
to deny injunctions even when plaintiffs had meritorious claims,
but they did not empower courts to employ balancing as a method-
ology for determining whether to grant an injunction. On the con-
trary, the courts uniformly rejected defendants' requests that
courts balance the competing interests in determining either liabil-
ity or remedy.
The longstanding rejection of balancing is clearest in nuisance
cases, precisely the area in which the post-Civil War courts later
adopted a balancing approach. As tort law developed through the
mid-nineteenth century, abatement was ordinarily required when-
ever an ongoing activity constituted a nuisance, regardless of how
profitable or important the nuisance-making activity was and re-
gardless of how much more significant the tortious activity was
relative to the injury.27 In the seminal William Aldred's Case, re-
25 See, e.g., 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries *220-21; Maddock, supra note 24,
at 287 ("The court, it is said, has a discretion in such cases, and so it has; but it is not
an arbitrary and capricious, but a regulated and judicial discretion; a discretion gov-
erned by established rules of equity."); 1 Frederick Pollock & Frederic William Mait-
land, The History of English Law Before the Time of Edward I, at 168 (1895) ("[O]ur
king's court is according to very ancient tradition a court that can do whatever equity
may require.").
26 These defenses derived from a relatively well-established set of maxims, which
guided the court's discretion in issuing equitable relief. See Richard Francis, Maxims
of Equity (London, J. Stephens 1726).
27See Annotation, Doctrine of Comparative Injury in Suit to Enjoin Nuisance, 31
L.R.A. 881, 888 (1911) ("[I]t is established by the weight of authority that where the
existence of a nuisance is clearly shown, together with the fact that it is causing an-
other material, substantial, and irreparable injury for which there is no adequate rem-
edy at law, the injured person is primarily entitled, as a matter of right, to the issuance
of an injunction enjoining or abating the nuisance, without reference to the compara-
tive benefits conferred thereby, or the comparative injuries resulting therefrom; and
in such cases the issuance of the injunction is not discretionary with the court."). As
Professor Plater has explained, abatement orders and injunctions are overlapping but
not identical orders, as abatement "is a functional term referring to the decision to
restrict the defendant's activity," while injunctions are "remedial directives designed
to implement the court's determinations on threshold questions, substantive liability,
2010] 493
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ported by Lord Coke in 1611, a property owner complained that
the "fetid and unwholesome stink" coming from a neighbor's hog
farm amounted to a private nuisance.' The hog farmer asserted
that the plaintiff was not entitled to a remedy because the hog farm
was a very valuable operation, while the discomfort from the smell
was minor.' The King's Bench rejected the argument that the court
should compare the harms to the plaintiff resulting from the nui-
sance with the benefits that the defendant accrued from operating
the hog farm; instead, the court applied the maxim sic utere tuo Ut
alienum non laedas, meaning "use your own (property) so as not to
harm another."' Aldred's Case thus reflects the then-prevalent
conception that property rights were absolute, which meant that a
property owner's ability to obtain relief could not depend on bal-
ancing the harm to his property interests against the benefit the de-
fendant obtained by causing that harm."
Aldred's Case continued to express the governing principle
through the time of Blackstone and until after the Civil War. As
Lord Coke explained, the economic and social value of an activity
does not establish a defense in a nuisance action: "[T]he building of
a lime-kiln is good and profitable; but if it be built so near a house,
that when it burns the smoke thereof enters in the house, so that
none can dwell there, an action lies for it."3 The fact that polluting
activity was "good and profitable" thus provided no basis for refus-
ing to enjoin a nuisance. Writing at the end of the eighteenth cen-
tury, Blackstone agreed that an actionable nuisance arose from ac-
tivities that were harmful to the enjoyment of private property,
whenever "one's neighbor sets up and exercises any offensive
trade; as a tanner's, a tallowchandler's, or the like."3 In these cases
and future conduct." Zygmunt J.B. Plater, Statutory Violations and Equitable Discre-
tion, 70 Cal. L. Rev. 524, 540 (1982).
2 William Aldred's Case, (1611) 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B.).
29 Id. at 817.
0 Id. at 821.
3 See Morag-Levine, supra note 22, at 40-47 (discussing Aldred's Case); Jeff L.
Lewin, Boomer and the American Law of Nuisance: Past, Present, and Future, 54
Alb. L. Rev. 189, 195 n.30 (1990) (discussing the sic utere rule as an absolute liability
standard); see also 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries *119 ("And the absolute
rights of each individual were defined to be the right of personal security, the right of
personal liberty, and the right of private property.").
32Aldred's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 821.
3 3 William Blackstone, Commentaries *217.
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and all other nuisance actions, the value and legality of the defen-
dant's actions provided no defense: it was irrelevant to Blackstone
that "these are lawful and necessary trades."'
Although Aldred's Case shows only that courts rejected a bal-
ancing approach in establishing liability for nuisances, rather than
in addressing the standard for remedies, no case before 1868 sug-
gests that balancing was any more appropriate in determining
remedies than in establishing liability. Blackstone explained that
property owners complaining of nuisances could obtain either
damages or an abatement order, neither of which depended on
balancing." Blackstone further stated that a party operating a fac-
tory that emits pollution constituting a nuisance is under a legal ob-
ligation not merely to pay damages but to take action to cease cre-
ating the nuisance:
"[I]f one erects a smelting house for lead so near the land of an-
other, that the vapor and smoke kills his corn and grass, and
damages his cattle therein, this is held to be a nuisance ....
[And] it is incumbent on him to find some other place to do that
act, where it will be less offensive."
Blackstone gives no suggestion that a tortfeasor's obligation to
cease a tortious activity depended on a comparison between the
degree of harm and the costs of abatement."
To be sure, doctrines established before the development of eq-
uitable balancing gave courts limited authority to examine the costs
of both granting and denying injunctions. For instance, nineteenth-
century courts could, to a limited degree, examine the extent to
which a plaintiff's injury would be alleviated by an injunction be-
M Id.
" Id. at *219-22.
3 Id. at *217-18 (emphasis added); see also Morag-Levine, supra note 22, at 45-46.
" Reviewing the works of several legal historians, Professor Leslie Rosenthal con-
cluded that the English courts "would almost invariably grant an injunction to restrain
a continuing nuisance, and the courts became, and remain, reluctant to use anything
other than injunctions in nuisance cases." Leslie Rosenthal, Economic Efficiency,
Nuisance, and Sewage: New Lessons from Attorney-General v. Council of the Bor-
ough of Birmingham, 1858-1895, 36 J. Legal Stud. 27, 35 (2007) (citation omitted); id.
at 33 ("Regarding the place of a social utility or balance-of-convenience defense for
nuisance, traditionally, following Aldred's Case (77 Eng. Rep. 816 [1619]), the estab-
lished general rule for nuisance has been that the utility or benefit from the actions
causing the nuisance was no defense.").
2010]1 495
Virginia Law Review
cause equitable principles established that injunctions could not be
issued for de minimis harms." Likewise, when a plaintiff delayed
bringing suit, and a defendant asserted the defense of laches, courts
considered whether the delay had unreasonably caused the defen-
dant prejudice, an examination that could encompass consideration
of the costs that an injunction would impose on the defendant.3 9
Such doctrines gave courts of equity limited authority to consider
the benefits to the plaintiff from receiving an injunction, as well as
the costs that an injunction would impose on defendants. Yet no
doctrines allowed courts to compare the costs and benefits that
would result from granting or withholding an injunction. While it
may appear to be a small step to move from independently examin-
ing the costs and benefits that would result from granting or deny-
ing injunctions to comparing the costs and benefits in applying a
balancing test, the movement to a balancing test represents a dra-
matic expansion of judicial power. As the next section shows, when
courts embraced the authority to compare costs and benefits, they
became empowered to consider whether, all things considered,
granting an injunction would do more good than harm, a previ-
ously unknown judicial power.
2. The Industrial Revolution and the Creation of Equitable
Balancing
Before the industrial revolution, nuisances tended to be caused
by relatively small enterprises, and the parties on each side in nui-
sance actions-farmers, homeowners, and small industrial con-
cerns-typically were of roughly equal economic size.40 Over the
course of the nineteenth century, however, as factories grew larger
3 See, e.g., Walter v. Selfe, (1851) 64 Eng. Rep. 849, 852 (Ch.) ("[O]ught this incon-
venience to be considered in fact as more than fanciful, more than one of mere deli-
cacy or fastidiousness, as an inconvenience materially interfering with the ordinary
comfort physically of human existence, not merely according to elegant or dainty
modes and habits of living, but according to plain and sober and simple notions
among the English people?"); S.S. Peloubet, A Collection of Legal Maxims in Law
and Equity 1 411, at 50 (New York, Diossy 1880) (citing the maxim de minimis non
curat lex).
" See 2 John Norton Pomeroy, A Treatise on Equity Jurisprudence § 419 (San
Francisco, Bancroft-Whitney 5th ed. 1941).
4 See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, in Collected Legal Papers 183
(1920).
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and more numerous, defendants in nuisance actions were often
much more economically important than the plaintiffs, and courts
began to question whether it made sense to shut down enterprises
that made millions of dollars and employed thousands of employ-
ees in order to protect a few poor farmers.4 1 No existing doctrine,
however, authorized courts to deny an injunction based on the
court's conclusion that the injunction would be economically inef-
ficient. Equitable balancing developed to fill that need.
Richard's Appeal, decided by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
in 1868, is recognized as the first case in which a court balanced the
equities to determine whether to grant an injunction.42 In that case,
a homeowner sought an injunction to stop an iron manufacturer
from burning coal and discharging soot and smoke, which the
plaintiff claimed made his house uninhabitable.43 Agreeing that the
air pollution constituted an ongoing nuisance, the court nonethe-
less ruled that an injunction should not be issued. As the court con-
cluded, iron manufacturing was a lawful business and could not be
conducted without burning coal and discharging smoke and soot."
The court explained that an injunction was a discretionary remedy,
which should not be issued without comparing the benefits of the
injunction against its costs: "It is elementary law, that in equity a
decree is never of right, as a judgment at law is, but of grace. Hence
the chancellor will consider whether he would not do a greater in-
4 For instance, in Crowder v. Tinkler, (1816) 34 Eng. Rep. 645 (Ch.), Lord Chancel-
lor Eldon signaled that courts should consider the economic and social consequences
of issuing injunctions against large enterprises. Property owners had sought an injunc-
tion against the construction of a gunpowder mill, which they alleged would cause
pollution that would damage their property. The court declared that, before issuing
an injunction, courts should weigh the consequences: "[G]reat caution is required in
granting an Injunction of this nature, where the effect will be to stop a large concern
in a lucrative trade." Id. at 646. The court did not, however, purport to compare the
benefits from the manufacturer of gunpowder against the costs to the plaintiffs of hav-
in the mill nearby.
2 Richard's Appeal, 57 Pa. 105 (1868); see Hoffer, supra note 22, at 152 (describing
Richard's Appeal as the first case to employ a balance of equities analysis); George P.
Smith II & Griffin W. Fernandez, The Price of Beauty: An Economic Approach to
Aesthetic Nuisance, 15 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 53, 60 (1991) (same); David E. Cole,
Note, Judicial Discretion and the "Sunk Costs" Strategy of Government Agencies, 30
B.C. Envtl. Aff. L. Rev. 689, 716 (2003) (same).
4 Richard's Appeal, 57 Pa. at 106.
" Id. at 111-12.
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jury by enjoining than would result from refusing." 45 In considering
whether ordering an injunction would "do a greater injury" than
denying an injunction, the court noted that the iron works repre-
sented a $500,000 investment and employed over one thousand
men, while the plaintiffs suffered only minor property damage. In-
junction denied.'
In describing the balance of equities as "elementary law," Rich-
ard's Appeal suggests that the court was applying a well-established
doctrine, but no previous cases can be identified in which judges
openly engaged in such balancing.47 One might suppose that, al-
though the language of balancing was new, it nevertheless de-
scribed existing equity practice; but, as discussed above, no doc-
trine allowed courts to compare the costs and benefits of granting
an injunction. Certain doctrines like laches allowed courts to exam-
ine the costs that an injunction might impose on the defendant,
while other doctrines, such as the de minimis doctrine, allowed
courts to examine the benefits that an injunction would bring. De-
ciding whether the costs of granting an injunction outweighed the
costs of denying it was unknown. Untroubled by the novelty of this
methodology, several other courts in the late nineteenth century
adopted balancing and likewise presented it as a longstanding equi-
table practice.48
Although the courts that first created and adopted equitable
balancing presented it as a longstanding practice, they were re-
freshingly honest that the principal virtue of balancing was that it
protected industry from injunctions for the mere inconveniences
caused by pollution. For instance, in the 1886 case of Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Sanderson, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court held that
neither damages nor an injunction should be issued to abate water
pollution from coal mining, explaining that "[t]o encourage the de-
4 Id. at 113-14.
4 Id. at 107, 114.
" As scholars have noted, the two cases cited by the court for the notion that bal-
ancing was elemental did not actually involve balancing. See Hoffer, supra note 22, at
152-53; Smith & Fernandez, supra note 42, at 57-60.
4 For instance, in 1889 the Alabama Supreme Court described balancing as the rule
that applies whenever injunctions are sought against nuisances, Clifton Iron Co. v.
Dye, 6 So. 192, 193 (Ala. 1889), and in 1897 a federal circuit court described equitable
balancing as "the recognized rule of the cases, both English and American, state and
federal." R.R. & Tel. Cos. v. Bd. of Equalizers, 85 F. 302, 308 (C.C. Tenn. 1897).
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velopment of the great natural resources of a country trifling in-
conveniences to particular persons must sometimes give way to the
necessities of a great community."49 The "trifling inconveniences"
from which plaintiffs sought relief included the claims that coal
mining wastes had made the local stream unfit for domestic use
and killed all the fish living in it."o The court did not deny that these
"inconveniences" caused the plaintiffs cognizable injuries, nor that
coal mining near the plaintiffs' homes constituted a nuisance. In-
stead, the court ruled that an injunction should not be issued be-
cause these injuries were insignificant compared to the benefits
from coal mining."
As it developed, equitable balancing empowered courts to un-
dertake ad hoc cost-benefit analysis, as can be seen in Madison v.
Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., a 1904 Tennessee case that
has become celebrated as a typical common law nuisance action
employing equitable balancing.52 The plaintiffs were farmers who
complained that smoke from the defendant's open-air copper
smelting operation destroyed the trees and crops on their property
and made it difficult to live in their homes." The court agreed that
the smelting operation constituted a nuisance but held that the bal-
ance of equities did not support an injunction. On the one hand, an
injunction would protect the plaintiffs' property, which was worth
less than $1000. On the other hand, an injunction would cause sig-
nificant economic disruption because it would destroy "property
worth nearly $2,000,000, and wreck two great mining and manufac-
turing enterprises, that are engaged in work of very great impor-
tance, not only to their owners, but to the state, and to the whole
country as well."' As the court saw it, the plaintiffs would suffer a
small loss if an injunction were denied, while the defendants would
" Pa. Coal Co. v. Sanderson, 6 A. 453, 459 (Pa. 1886).
'
0 Id. at 453, 454.
Id. at 459, 465.
52Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 83 S.W. 658, 664-65 (Tenn.
1904). The case has become part of the environmental law canon and appears in sev-
eral environmental casebooks, including David M. Driesen & Robert W. Adler, Envi-
ronmental Law: A Conceptual and Pragmatic Approach 42-45 (2007); Robert W.
Percival, et al., Environmental Regulation: Law, Science, and Policy 67-69 (6th ed.
2009); Zygmunt J.B. Plater et al., Environmental Law and Policy: Nature, Law, and
Society 164 (4th ed. 2004).
'
3 Ducktown Sulphur, 83 S.W. at 659.
" Id. at 666-67.
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suffer a much larger loss, which in turn would cause ripple effects
in the local, state, and national economies. In the absence of bal-
ancing, the court may have had no doctrinal basis to deny an in-
junction, but, once the costs and benefits of an injunction were
openly weighed, the court's decision was easy: "We think there can
be no doubt as to what the true answer to this question should
be."55
It bears emphasis that, in the era in which equitable balancing
developed, common law courts, not legislatures, were the primary
institutions setting industrial regulations." Equitable balancing
gave courts an important mechanism for establishing industrial
policies by allowing them to decide whether it would be efficient to
order pollution controls by comparing the benefits of industrializa-
tion against the costs of pollution controls." The courts made clear
that in their view the balance ordinarily tipped heavily in favor of
industry. In a memorable passage, a Pennsylvania court penned
this ode to air pollution:
While smoke per se is objectionable and adds nothing to the
outer aesthetics of any community, it is not without its connota-
tional beauty as it rises in clouds from smoke stacks of furnaces
and ovens (and even gob fires) telling the world that the fires of
prosperity are burning,-the fires that assure economic security
to the workingman, as well as establish profitable returns on
capital legitimately invested."
The court declared that the costs of preventing air pollution were
too high compared to the value of industry: "[W]e cannot give
Mediterranean skies to the plaintiffs, when by doing so, we may
send the workers and bread-winners of the community involved to
the Black Sea of destitution."" As the Pennsylvania Supreme
" Id. at 666.
1 See Frank Dobbin, Forging Industrial Policy: The United States, Britain, and
France in the Railway Age 2 (1994).
" See Hoffer, supra note 22, at 157 (asserting that within decades after the creation
of equitable balancing, the practice had become "an extensively researched and ar-
gued invitation to the chancellor to manage controversy over industrial pollution and
waste disposal").
'a Versailles Borough v. McKeesport Coal & Coke Co., 83 Pittsburgh Legal J. 379
(Pitt. Co. Ct. 1935).
'
9 Id. at 394.
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Court later declared, "one's bread is more important than land-
scape or clear skies."' After all, the court explained, "[w]ithout
smoke, Pittsburgh would have remained a very pretty village.""6
Once empowered to openly balance competing interests in the
context of remedying industrial pollution, courts put the power to
increasing use. Having gained a foothold in nuisance actions, equi-
table balancing began to be used in other causes of action, includ-
ing trespass, contract, and copyright.62 Courts also began to employ
equitable balancing not merely to decide whether to issue an in-
junction, but in tailoring the remedy. For instance, under the guise
of equitable balancing, some courts issued injunctions that required
factories to employ the best available technologies for controlling
pollution, striking a middle ground between ordering factories to
shut down and allowing uncontrolled pollution." Equitable balanc-
ing even crossed the line from being merely a remedial doctrine for
determining whether to issue injunctions and began to be em-
ployed by some courts to determine nuisance liability itself.' The
age of balancing had begun.
3. Equitable Balancing Remained Controversial up to the Moment It
Was Declared Long Established
Notwithstanding the expressions by some nineteenth-century
courts that equitable balancing was the accepted rule, the doctrine
remained controversial at least into the 1930s."' An 1893 treatise on
6 Waschak v. Moffat, 109 A.2d 310, 316 (Pa. 1954).
61 Id.; cf. Griffin v. Southern Ry. Co., 64 S.E. 16, 17 (N.C. 1909) ("It is contrary to
the policy of the law to use the extraordinary powers of the court to arrest the devel-
opment of industrial enterprises, or the progress of works prosecuted apparently for
the public good, as well as for private gain.").
62See Hoffer, supra note 22, at 154-57; W. Page Keeton, Notes on "Balancing the
Equities," 18 Tex. L. Rev. 412, 412-13 (1940); Comment, Injunction-Nuisance-
Balance of Convenience, 37 Yale L.J. 96, 100 nn.15-16 (1927) (collecting cases).
63 See, e.g., Smith v. Staso Milling Co., 18 F.2d 736, 739 (2d Cir. 1927).
' Indeed, the Restatement (Second) of Torts endorses this approach. See Restate-
ment (Second) of Torts § 826 (1977). Under this approach, courts balance the equities
at both the liability and remedial stages.
6 Bone, supra note 22, at 1178; Developments in the Law: Equity-1933, 47 Harv.
L. Rev. 1174, 1197 n.192 (1934) (stating that "there is some conflict of opinion as to
the acceptance of this relative interests doctrine" and citing conflicting cases and trea-
tises). Zechariah Chafee, Jr., writing in 1930, criticized a treatise on equitable reme-
dies because it "cites no cases rejecting the doctrine." Zechariah Chafee, Jr., Book
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nuisance bluntly denied that courts ever engaged in balancing in
determining whether to issue injunctions.' In 1919, the leading
treatise on equitable remedies recognized that some courts had
adopted a balancing approach but nonetheless declared that "[t]he
weight of authority is against allowing a balancing of injury as a
means of determining the propriety of issuing an injunction."" As
late as 1929, balancing was described as the minority position.'
Courts rejected equitable balancing both for substantive and in-
stitutional reasons. The principal substantive objection to balanc-
ing was that it required courts to set a price on individual rights,
most importantly property rights. As one treatise writer put it,
"[r]ights are not to be measured, so it is said, by their money value,
neither are wrongs to be tolerated because it may be much to the
advantage of the wrongdoer."69 To compare the costs of granting
and denying an injunction, courts would have had to measure the
Review, 43 Harv. L. Rev. 840, 842 (1930) (reviewing Fred F. Lawrence, A Treatise on
the Substantive Law of Equity Jurisprudence (1929)).
' 2 H.G. Wood, A Practical Treatise on the Law of Nuisances in their Various
Forms; Including Remedies Therefor at Law and in Equity § 801, at 1176-77 (3d ed.
1893) ("Courts do not stop to balance conveniences; if a substantial legal right is in-
vaded by the unlawful exercise of a trade or use of property by another, the smallness
of the damage on the one side, or its magnitude on the other, is not a fact ordinarily of
any special weight, but if the right and its violation are clear, an injunction will issue
regardless of consequences.").
5 John Norton Pomeroy, Jr., Pomeroy's Equity Jurisprudence and Equitable
Remedies § 1944, at 4416 (2d ed. 1919).
"Note, Nuisance-Absence of Negligence-Economic Unavoidability as Defense,
77 U. Pa. L. Rev. 550, 552 (1929). Even in jurisdictions that adopted balancing, many
courts did so only for preliminary injunctions but not for permanent injunctions, while
other courts, notably the United States Supreme Court, rejected balancing in cases
involving government parties. See Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 236-39
(1907), discussed infra notes 82-84 and accompanying text; George L. Clark, Equity:
An Analysis and Discussion of Modern Equity Problems, with Notes on Illinois Cases
§ 212, at 275 (1920); 3 Thomas Atkins Street, Federal Equity Practice: A Treatise on
the Pleadings Used and Practice Followed in Courts of the United States in the Exer-
cise of Their Equity Jurisdiction § 2437, at 1418 (1909) ("The doctrine of the balance
of convenience or injury, which often determines the granting or refusal of a prelimi-
nary injunction, has little or no application on final hearing.").
0 Street, supra note 68, at 1418; Hulbert v. Cal. Portland Cement Co., 118 P. 928,
932 (Cal. 1911) ("There can be no balancing of conveniences when such balancing in-
volves the preservation of an established right."); see also Bone, supra note 22, at
1178 (explaining that some nineteenth-century courts concluded that "an absolute
right to injunctive relief followed automatically from the fact that defendant had in-
vaded plaintiffs property right ... since the value of plaintiffs property right could
not be measured in monetary terms").
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significance of harm to property rights imposed by a nuisance, but
reducing property rights to an economic value conflicted with the
understood nature of individual rights as nearly absolute trumps
that could not be sacrificed in the name of efficiency.'o As one
court that rejected balancing put it, "every substantial, material
right of person or property is entitled to protection against all the
world."" As these courts understood it, balancing was inappropri-
ate because it required courts to calculate the incalculable.
A related substantive objection was that, because equitable bal-
ancing required that property rights be monetized, balancing would
treat some property rights as more important than others, unfairly
favoring the rich and powerful over the poor and weak. In Whalen
v. Union Bag & Paper Co., the New York Court of Appeals
granted an injunction shutting down the operation of a million-
dollar pulp mill that polluted a stream and caused about one hun-
dred dollars of damage to the plaintiff's property.72 The court re-
jected a balancing approach because it would favor the wealthy:
Although the damage to the plaintiff may be slight as compared
with the defendant's expense of abating the condition, that is not
a good reason for refusing an injunction. Neither courts of equity
nor law can be guided by such a rule, for if followed to its logical
conclusion it would deprive the poor litigant of his little property
by giving it to those already rich.73
By some accounts, New York continues to reject the balance of
equities doctrine.74
"See 1 William Blackstone, Commentaries *134 ("The third absolute right, inher-
ent in every Englishman, is that of property. . ."); cf. Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights
Seriously 193-95 (1977) (discussing rights as "trumps"). But see Richard H. Pildes,
Why Rights Are Not Trumps: Social Meanings, Expressive Harms, and Constitution-
alism, 27 J. Legal Stud. 725, 727 (1998).
' Woodruff v. N. Bloomfield Gravel Mining Co., 18 F. 753, 807 (C.C. Cal. 1884).
* Whalen v. Union Bag & Paper Co., 101 N.E. 805,806 (N.Y. 1913).
Id. at 806; cf. Woodruff, 18 F. at 807 ("If the smaller interest must yield to the lar-
ger, all small property rights, and all smaller and less important enterprises, industries,
and pursuits would sooner or later be absorbed by the large, more powerful few.").
74 See, e.g., Boomer v. Atl. Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870, 872 (N.Y. 1970) (declaring
that Whalen's rejection of the balance of injuries "authoritatively states the rule in
New York"). But see Daniel A. Farber, The Story of Boomer: Pollution and the
Common Law, 32 Ecology L.Q. 113, 126 (2005) ("On a first reading of the opinion,
Boomer appears to overrule the Whalen rule.").
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In addition to these substantive objections, courts rejected bal-
ancing on the institutional ground that balancing was incompatible
with the judicial role. Weighing the relative interests presented in a
case was thought by some to be a legislative task and therefore be-
yond the power of the court. As one judge put it, "I am not sitting
here as a committee of public safety, armed with arbitrary power to
prevent what, it is said, will be a great injury, not to Birmingham
only, but to all England; that is not my function."" Courts thus de-
clared that their job was simply to prevent the violation of rights,
regardless of the consequences to the defendants or the public.7 6
Even advocates of balancing sometimes described it as "legisla-
tive" in character.7
Notwithstanding these criticisms, by the 1930s, equitable balanc-
ing had become a relatively accepted practice. In 1939 the Ameri-
can Law Institute issued the first Restatement of Torts, which gave
its partial imprimatur to equitable balancing, agreeing that the
relative hardship of the parties resulting from granting or denying
an injunction was an appropriate factor for courts to consider in
deciding whether to issue an injunction." By 1943 equitable balanc-
7 Woodruff, 18 F. at 806 (quoting Attorney Gen. v. Council of Birmingham, 4 Kay
& J. 539 (1858)).
" See id. at 806 ("We are simply to determine whether the complainant's rights have
been infringed, and, if so, afford him such relief as the law entitles him to receive,
whatever the consequence or inconvenience to the wrong-doers or to the general pub-
lic may be."); Williams v. Haile Gold Mining Co., 66 S.E. 117, 118 (S.C. 1909) ("[T]he
court could not have considered, in deciding whether to grant or refuse the injunction,
the question raised by the defendant as to the balance of convenience, or of advan-
tage or disadvantage to the plaintiff and defendant and the public at large, for the de-
fendant's use of the stream. That question would be pertinent only in an application
addressed to the Legislature . . .").
' See Comment, Injunction-Nuisance-Balance of Convenience, 37 Yale L.J. 96,
100 (1927) (acknowledging the legislative nature of balancing but asserting that courts
are "active, potent, and not undesirable lawmaker[s]"); cf. Benjamin N. Cardozo, The
Nature of the Judicial Process, 113-14 (Yale University Press) (1921) (discussing the
le islative aspect of judicial balancing of interests).
Restatement of Torts § 941 (1939). The Restatement rejected as overly simplistic,
however, what it termed the "balance of convenience" approach, under which courts
simply considered the benefits and costs of granting or denying an injunction. Id. at
cmt. a. ("The law does not grant an injunction merely because of the advantage which
the plaintiff might reap from it, and it does not refuse an injunction merely because of
the convenience which that refusal might afford the defendant."). Instead, the Re-
statement suggested that the balance of equities should also seek to weigh the parties'
relative responsibility for the harm and the parties' good faith, among other factors.
Id. at cmt. b.
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ing had become entrenched as a factor for deciding injunctions,
and Justice Frankfurter described balancing the equities to be
among the "usual considerations governing the exercise of equity
jurisdiction."7 9 After all, the Supreme Court explained the follow-
ing year, "[w]e are dealing here with the requirements of equity
practice with a background of several hundred years of history.""o
B. The Adoption of Equitable Balancing in Statutory Cases
In 1944 the Supreme Court characterized equitable balancing as
a well-established factor for determining whether to issue injunc-
tions in private litigation, but it was not until 1982 that the Court
first held that balancing should also be used to determine whether
to enjoin violations of federal statutes." In the years between 1944
and 1982, it appeared that the Court considered equitable balanc-
ing inappropriate-perhaps even unconstitutional-in determining
whether to enjoin statutory violations. Eventually, however, the
Court embraced equitable balancing whenever injunctions were
sought against the government for violating federal statutes. The
Court adopted equitable balancing in statutory cases essentially for
the same reasons that state courts had adopted equitable balancing
in common law actions. Just as state court judges sought a doctrine
that would give them discretion to deny injunctions that they be-
lieved would do more harm than good, such as an injunction that
shut down a large factory to protect a few dirt farmers, so the Su-
preme Court sought a doctrine under which it could avoid enjoin-
ing violations of federal statutes when the Court perceived that an
injunction would do more harm than good. The supposedly ancient
doctrine of equitable balancing once again filled that need.
7 Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 345 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
"Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944).
8 See Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (holding that equi-
table balancing should be applied in determining whether to enjoin violations of the
Clean Water Act); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440 (1944) (stating that "in
suits in which only private interests are involved" courts exercise their equitable dis-
cretion by "balanc[ing] the conveniences of the parties and possible injuries to them
according as they may be affected by the granting or withholding of the injunction").
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1. The Court's Rejection of Equitable Balancing When the
Government Seeks an Injunction Against Private Parties
In the first cases in which the Supreme Court addressed equita-
ble balancing, the Court ruled that federal courts should not bal-
ance the equities when the government seeks an injunction against
private parties. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper was a public nuisance
action brought by the State of Georgia for an injunction to stop air
pollution coming into the state from the same Tennessee smelting
operation at issue in Ducktown Sulphur.' Writing for the Court,
Justice Holmes stated that the balance of equities might have pre-
cluded an injunction if the case had involved private parties, but
the Court could not balance the state's interests in protecting its
sovereign territory against the smelter's interest in continuing to
operate without pollution controls.' Granting the injunction with-
out balancing the equities, the Court declared that whether an in-
junction would do more harm than good was for Georgia to decide,
not the Court.84
In 1940 the Court first addressed the application of equitable
balancing in a statutory context and squarely rejected it.' United
States v. City of San Francisco arose when the United States sought
an injunction against the city and county of San Francisco for sell-
ing electrical power in violation of the Raker Act, which had
granted California the right to dam, divert, and use water from the
Hetch-Hetchy Valley in Yosemite National Park, subject to certain
conditions. San Francisco argued that, even if its actions violated
the conditions imposed by the Raker Act, an injunction should not
' Georgia v. Tenn. Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230, 236 (1907). Between the two cases,
the Ducktown smelter had changed its smelting method from open air roasting to us-
ing smokestacks, which had the effect of protecting the local areas from sulfur dioxide
but sending the smoke across the state line to Georgia, where it destroyed forests and
polluted streams. See Thomas W. Merrill, Golden Rules for Transboundary Pollution,
46 Duke L.J. 931, 943 (1997).
a Tenn. Copper, 206 U.S. at 237-38 ("The case has been argued largely as if it were
one between two private parties; but it is not. The very elements that would be relied
upon in a suit between fellow-citizens as a ground for equitable relief are wanting
here. The State owns very little of the territory alleged to be affected, and the damage
to it capable of estimate in money, possibly, at least, is small.").
" Id. at 239 ("Whether Georgia by insisting upon this claim is doing more harm than
good to her own citizens is for her to determine.").
" United States v. City of S.F., 310 U.S. 16, 30 (1940).
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be granted because it was unsupported by the balance of equities.'
Writing for the Court, Justice Black, a strong opponent of balanc-
ing tests in other cases, rejected the invocation of balancing in the
statutory context.' As Black concluded, balancing was not called
for in the face of a clear statutory violation:
[T]his case does not call for a balancing of equities or for the in-
vocation of the generalities of judicial maxims in order to deter-
mine whether an injunction should have issued. The City is avail-
ing itself of valuable rights and privileges granted by the
Government and yet persists in violating the very conditions
upon which those benefits were granted."
Just as the Court had rejected balancing when Georgia sought an
injunction, the Court rejected balancing the equities when the
United States sought an injunction."
Nonetheless, several years later, the Court suggested that equi-
table balancing might apply when the government seeks an injunc-
tion for statutory violations when it made clear that establishment
of a statutory violation did not automatically mandate an injunc-
tion, although the Court stopped short of declaring that equitable
balancing should necessarily apply.' In Hecht v. Bowles, the United
States sought an injunction against a department store for selling
goods at prices higher than those allowed under the wartime
Emergency Price Control Act. The store had apparently violated
the law inadvertently and, by the time the case reached the Su-
preme Court, the store had come into compliance. The lower
courts had concluded that an injunction was not necessary to en-
sure continued compliance, but the United States nonetheless ar-
gued that an injunction was mandatory in the face of proof of a
MId.
" Id. at 30-31. Black famously rejected balancing approaches in constitutional cases.
See, e.g., Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 75 (1970) (Black, J., concurring) ("Those
who wrote and adopted our Constitution and Bill of Rights engaged in all the balanc-
ing necessary.").
City of S.F., 310 U.S. at 30.
Id. at 31 ("The equitable doctrines relied on do not militate against the capacity of
a court of equity as a proper forum in which to make a declared policy of Congress
effective. Injunction to prohibit continued use-in violation of that policy--of prop-
erty granted by the United States, and to enforce the grantee's covenants, is both ap-
propriate and necessary.").
Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 330 (1944).
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statutory violation. The Court disagreed, ruling that the statute
preserved the courts' discretion to employ "traditional practices"
in deciding whether to issue injunctions.9 1 Hecht did not address
whether these traditional practices included equitable balancing,
although other cases from the era support this conclusion.' Yet
Hecht made clear that the equitable considerations governing the
issuance of injunctions in common law cases must be adjusted in
the context of statutory violations. As the Court declared, "the
standards of the public interest, not the requirements of private
litigation, measure the propriety and need for injunctive relief in
these cases.""
2. The Court's Initial Rejection of Equitable Balancing in Statutory
Cases
In 1978, in Tennessee Valley Authority ("TVA") v. Hill,94 the fa-
mous snail darter case, the Supreme Court first addressed whether
equitable balancing should govern a private party's motion to en-
join the government for violating a federal statute. Just as the
Court had rejected balancing in Georgia v. Tennessee Copper and
United States v. San Francisco when the government was the party
seeking an injunction, so the Court in TVA v. Hill rejected equita-
ble balancing when a private party sought an injunction against the
government. TVA v. Hill arose when environmental plaintiffs
sought an injunction to stop construction of the Tellico Dam on the
ground that the project would violate the Endangered Species Act
("ESA") by eradicating the snail darter, a species of fish that lived
only in the Little Tennessee River.95 By the time the case reached
the Supreme Court, it had largely been resolved that construction
of the dam would violate the ESA, leaving the question of remedy
as the main issue before the Court.
Like many other federal statutes, the ESA authorizes injunctive
relief without specifying any standard for when injunctions should
Id.
9 See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440 (1944) (describing equitable balanc-
in as the norm in private litigation).
3Bowles, 321 U.S. at 331.
437 U.S. 153 (1978).
Hill, 437 U.S. at 156-61 (1978).
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be granted.' The United States argued that the traditional doctrine
of equitable balancing should apply and that the balance would not
justify an injunction because the three-inch-long snail darter was
but one of 130 known darter species while the Tellico Dam was a
major federal project for which Congress had committed over $100
million.' Justice Rehnquist alone agreed that saving an insignifi-
cant fish species did not justify sacrificing a $100 million project."
A majority of the Court concluded, however, that it was not ap-
propriate for courts to balance the costs and benefits of an injunc-
tion as a remedy for a statutory violation because in the ESA Con-
gress had intended "to halt and reverse the trend toward species
extinction, whatever the cost."'
TVA v. Hill rejected equitable balancing for essentially the same
substantive and institutional reasons that convinced some common
law courts to reject balancing. First, the Court concluded that bal-
ancing would require it to assess and compare the value of seem-
ingly incommensurable interests: a federal hydroelectric project
and an endangered fish. The Court relied on separation-of-powers
principles in holding that it could not make such a comparison be-
cause, as the Court read the ESA, Congress had concluded that
endangered species have incalculable value: "Quite obviously, it
would be difficult for a court to balance the loss of a sum certain-
even $100 million-against a congressionally declared 'incalcula-
ble' value, even assuming we had the power to engage in such a
weighing process, which we emphatically do not."" Second, the
Court concluded that balancing competing interests amounts to a
legislative task and therefore exceeds its judicial role:
While "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department to say what the law is," it is equally-and emphati-
cally-the exclusive province of the Congress not only to formu-
late legislative policies and mandate programs and projects, but
Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1)(A) (2006).
* As Justice Stevens later described it, "Griffin Bell, then Attorney General,
brought a snail darter in a glass jar into the courtroom to dramatize the de minimis
character of the public interest at stake." John Paul Stevens, Learning on the Job, 74
Fordham L. Rev. 1561, 1564 (2006).
Hill, 437 U.S. at 213 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
"Id. at 184 (majority opinion).
" Id. at 187-88.
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also to establish their relative priority for the Nation. Once Con-
gress, exercising its delegated powers, has decided the order of
priorities in a given area, it is for the Executive to administer the
laws and for the courts to enforce them when enforcement is
sought."'o
Congress, the Court concluded, had already balanced the costs
and benefits in favor of preservation, and the courts had no busi-
ness second-guessing Congress's judgment.102
3. The Court's Adoption and Application of Equitable Balancing in
Statutory Cases
After the Court rejected equitable balancing in TVA v. Hill for
injunctions under the ESA, it briefly appeared that equitable bal-
ancing might not be required or even allowed before federal courts
could enjoin other statutory prohibitions. In Weinberger v. Ro-
mero-Barcelo, decided four years after the snail darter case, the
Court significantly backed away from the reasoning of TVA v. Hill
and held that courts should not enjoin violations of the Clean Wa-
ter Act unless the injunction is supported by the balance of equi-
ties." Since then, the Court has construed every federal statute
that it has examined to require equitable balancing. Amoco Pro-
duction Co. v. Village of Gambell holds that the Alaska National
Interest Lands Conservation Act ("ANILCA") requires equitable
balancing," and Winter extends this trend to the National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act, holding that injunctions can be issued to or-
der the government to stop violating that statute only when justi-
fied by the balance of equities."'
Romero-Barcelo not only holds that equitable balancing applies
to the Clean Water Act, it also establishes a strong presumption
that all federal statutes authorizing injunctive relief should be read
Id. at 194 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
" Id. at 195 ("[I]n our constitutional system the commitment to the separation of
powers is too fundamental for us to pre-empt congressional action by judicially de-
creeing what accords with 'common sense and the public weal."'). As the Court later
more bluntly explained, "Congress, it appeared to us, had chosen the snail darter over
the dam." Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 314 (1982).
in Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 312, 320.
'4 Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987).
'0 Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 376.
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to require equitable balancing. As in Winter, Romero-Barcelo
arose when environmentalists sought to stop Navy training exer-
cises based on the allegation that the Navy violated the Clean Wa-
ter Act by dropping bombs into the waters off Vieques Island in
Puerto Rico, polluting the waters without a permit.'" As in TVA v.
Hill, the government argued that a balance of equities analysis was
required before an injunction could be issued, and this time the
Court agreed." Declaring that equitable balancing was a "practice
with a background of several hundred years of history,"" the
Court held that it would presume that federal statutes authorizing
injunctive relief required equitable balancing because "we do not
lightly assume that Congress has intended to depart from estab-
lished principles."'" The strong presumption in favor of equitable
balancing is thus based on the principle that statutes should be read
to incorporate background legal principles, unless Congress has
made clear its intent otherwise.n0
Applying its newly fashioned presumption in favor of equitable
balancing, the Court construed the Clean Water Act not to fore-
close balancing."' The Court distinguished TVA v. Hill on the
ground that the Endangered Species Act establishes an absolute
prohibition on federal actions that jeopardize endangered species,
which the Court construed to signal that Congress intended to de-
prive courts of their usual discretion to select among available
remedies."2 in contrast, the Clean Water Act authorizes the issu-
ance of permits allowing pollution discharges, which the Court
construed to anticipate that permitting agencies would exercise
discretion and balancing, suggesting that the courts too should be
" Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 307.
Id. at 311-12.
" Id. at 313 (quoting Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944)).
" Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 313.
"oAs the Court has declared, "where a common-law principle is well established . . .
the courts may take it as given that Congress has legislated with an expectation that
the principle will apply except 'when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident."'
Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991) (quoting Is-
randtsen Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1952)); see also United States v. Texas,
507 U.S. 529, 534 (1993).
". Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. at 320.
"' Id. at 314 ("The purpose and language of the statute limited the remedies avail-
able to the District Court; only an injunction could vindicate the objectives of the
Act.").
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allowed to apply their traditional discretion in determining appro-
priate remedies for statutory violations."3
In Amoco, the Court applied the presumption in favor of equi-
table balancing that it had announced in Romero-Barcelo to a case
arising under the Alaska National Interests Lands Conservation
Act.114 ANILCA authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to approve
oil and gas development in Alaska's outer continental shelf as long
as the Secretary has evaluated the effects of development on natu-
ral resources used for subsistence by native Alaskans."' Several na-
tive Alaskan villages sought a preliminary injunction to stop oil de-
velopment by Amoco, arguing that the Department of the Interior
had not fulfilled its procedural obligation to consider the effects of
oil development on subsistence resources as required by ANILCA.
The Court concluded that, even if the leases were approved in vio-
lation of ANILCA, operation of the leases could not be enjoined
because of the balance of equities."' On one side of the balance, an
injunction would protect the plaintiffs by preventing harm to the
natural resources they used for subsistence, but the plaintiffs had
not shown that oil development would cause them harm; rather,
they had only shown that Interior had not properly analyzed
whether development would damage their subsistence resources."
"' Id. at 314-16. The distinction Romero-Barcelo draws between the supposedly ab-
solute prohibition established by the Endangered Species Act and the discretion em-
bodied in the Clean Water Act finds little support in the terms of the statutes. Both
statutes establish blanket prohibitions on certain broad categories of actions in order
to protect environmental values-the Endangered Species Act prohibits federal agen-
cies from taking acts that jeopardize endangered species, 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (2006),
while the Clean Water Act prohibits discharges of water pollution, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1311(a) (2006). Both statutes likewise establish permit programs under which ad-
ministrative agencies can authorize acts that would otherwise violate the prohibition.
See 16 U.S.C. § 1539(a) (2006); 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a) (2006). Although both statutes
envision the exercise of discretion in determining whether to grant permits, both stat-
utes grant that discretion to executive agencies, not courts. See Michael D. Axline,
Constitutional Implications of Injunctive Relief Against Federal Agencies in Envi-
ronmental Cases, 12 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 1, 26-27 (1988). What may instead distin-
guish the two cases is that the statutory violation at issue in TVA v. Hill was substan-
tive, while the violation at issue in Romero-Barcelo was procedural. Yet the Court has
not offered a justification for holding that equitable balancing should not apply to
substantive violations but should apply to procedural violations.
"1 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987).
"'Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act, 16 U.S.C. § 3120(a) (2006).
"'Amoco, 480 U.S. at 544-45.
"' Id.
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On the other side of the balance, an injunction could cost Amoco
the $70 million it had invested in the development project."' The
Supreme Court ruled that the procedural violation alleged by the
plaintiffs did not carry any weight in the balance of equities in the
absence of a showing that the violation would cause substantive
harm, in that case, damage to subsistence resources."' The Court
suggested that an injunction would "usually" be required if plain-
tiffs show that environmental harm would occur without an injunc-
tion, but a procedural violation alone, like the failure to obtain a
permit in Romero-Barcelo or the failure to study the impacts of de-
velopment on subsistence resources in Amoco, carries no weight in
the balance of equities.'20
Winter extends the application of equitable balancing to NEPA
and affirms Amoco's conclusion that injunctions cannot be issued
for violations of procedural requirements in the absence of proof
that the violation is likely to cause substantive environmental
harm. 2' Winter goes further, however, ruling that even proof of en-
vironmental damage is not always sufficient to justify an injunction
when the equities on the other side are especially strong, such as
the needs of national security. As in Amoco, the plaintiffs in Winter
challenged a procedural violation, the failure of the Secretary of
the Navy to issue an environmental impact statement analyzing the
impact of the use of mid-frequency sonar on whales prior to naval
training exercises involving the sonar. The plaintiffs presented evi-
dence that some whales (the exact number was disputed, as was the
extent of the harm) would be harmed by the sonar.'22 The Supreme
Court suggested, however, that harm to the whales could not be
considered in the balance of equities.'23 instead, harm to the whales
mattered only to the extent that it harmed the plaintiffs, because
"
8 Id.
"' Id. at 544 ("[T]he Ninth Circuit erroneously focused on the statutory procedure
rather than on the underlying substantive policy the process was designed to effect-
preservation of subsistence resources.").
20 Id. at 545 ("Environmental injury, by its nature, can seldom be adequately reme-
died by money damages and is often permanent or at least of long duration, i.e., ir-
reparable. If such injury is sufficiently likely, therefore, the balance of harms will usu-
ally favor the issuance of an injunction to protect the environment.").
' Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 376.
122 Id. at 371.
" Id. at 377-78.
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the balance of equities takes into account injuries to the parties,
not to the environment. 24 Thus, for harm to whales to carry any
weight in the balance of equities, the plaintiffs would have to show
that the sonar would harm enough whales that the plaintiffs' op-
portunities to go whale watching and make nature documentaries
would be diminished. Moreover, the Court declared, even if the
plaintiffs could show that the use of the sonar would result in di-
minished opportunities to go whale watching and make nature
documentaries, that injury would pale in comparison to the inter-
ests on the other side of the balance of equities, the Navy's interest
in training sailors, which the Court credited as essential to national
*125
security.
In mandating that federal courts can enjoin the government's
statutory violations only when an injunction is supported by the
balance of equities, the Supreme Court ensured that federal courts
would enjoy broad discretion to weigh the policy interests support-
ing and opposing the issuance of an injunction. For instance, in
Romero-Barcelo, the Court considered the interest in national se-
curity served by bombing training to be very significant, while the
interest in requiring water pollution permits was relatively trivial,
at least in the absence of proof that the violation caused environ-
mental harm."' In the "traditional" doctrine of equitable balancing,
the Court found judicial authority necessary to weigh these policy
interests and to avoid issuing injunctions that struck the Court as
unnecessary, wasteful, or silly.
After Winter, it is apparent that the Supreme Court considers
equitable balancing to govern all, or practically all, injunctions is-
sued by federal courts. The Court's adoption of equitable balanc-
ing is not limited to statutory contexts, as the Court has also ruled
that equitable balancing governs a federal court's decision whether
to enjoin violations of common law and the Constitution.'2 7 The
Court has also held that equitable balancing should apply in decid-
"4 Id. at 376.
125 Id.
'"Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 315 (1982).
'" See id. at 312 (holding equitable balancing applicable in federal statutory ac-
tions); Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294, 300 (1955) (holding equitable balancing
applicable in constitutional litigation); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440
(1944) (describing equitable balancing as the norm in private litigation).
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ing whether to grant both preliminary and permanent injunctions.'"
And the Court has not distinguished between the decision whether
to issue an injunction in the first place and the decision of what
terms an injunction should include; equitable balancing applies to
both decisions.29 The only modern case in which the Court has re-
jected equitable balancing is TVA v. Hill, and it appears that the
principles supporting that decision have little application outside
the context of the Endangered Species Act."
II. THE APPLICATION OF EQUITABLE BALANCING IN STATUTORY
CONTEXTS CONFLICTS WITH SEPARATION-OF-POWERS PRINCIPLES
As Part I showed, the Supreme Court has falsely presented equi-
table balancing as an ancient judicial practice, when in fact the doc-
trine gained acceptance in common law cases only in the early
twentieth century. The application of equitable balancing in statu-
tory cases only goes back to 1982, when the Court embraced the
practice based on the demonstrably false suggestion that the prac-
" See Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 381-82 (holding that its conclusion that no preliminary
injunction should have been issued would apply equally to a motion for a permanent
injunction).
" See United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 483, 498 (2001)
("To the extent the district court considers the public interest and the conveniences of
the parties, the court is limited to evaluating how such interest and conveniences are
affected by the selection of an injunction over other enforcement mechanisms.").
'It is somewhat unclear, however, whether equitable balancing applies when the
government seeks an injunction for a private party's statutory violation. Compare
Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. at 495-99 (stating the equitable balancing
should apply when the United States seeks an injunction under the Controlled Sub-
stances Act), and Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329-30 (1944) (holding that "tra-
ditional equitable principles" should determine whether the government was entitled
to injunctions under the federal price control statute), with California v. Am. Stores
Co., 495 U.S. 271, 295 (1990) ("In a Government case the proof of the violation of law
may itself establish sufficient public injury to warrant relief."). The lower courts ap-
parently have concluded that equitable balancing is not ordinarily required in gov-
ernment-initiated cases. See, e.g., United States v. Marine Shale Processors, 81 F.3d
1329, 1359 (5th Cir. 1996) (declaring that equitable balancing is precluded "when the
United States or a sovereign state sues in its capacity as protector of the public inter-
est"); U.S. EPA v. Envtl. Waste Control, Inc., 917 F.2d 327, 332 (7th Cir. 1990)
("[TJhe law of injunctions differs with respect to governmental plaintiffs (or private
attorneys general) as opposed to private individuals. Where the plaintiff is a sovereign
and where the activity may endanger the public health, 'injunctive relief is proper,
without resort to balancing."') (quoting Envtl. Def. Fund, Inc. v. Lamphier, 714 F.2d
331, 337-38 (4th Cir. 1983)).
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tice is longstanding. Of course, puffery regarding the history of eq-
uitable balancing does not itself make the doctrine illegitimate."
Yet the fiction that courts have always balanced the equities in de-
ciding whether to grant injunctions serves to obscure significant
separation-of-powers problems. Indeed, the absence of historical
support for balancing the equities in statutory cases itself should
give rise to separation-of-powers concerns because, in the absence
of statutory or constitutional support for one branch's assertion of
power, the Court has relied on the "gloss" that history has placed
on the separation of powers.'32
This Part argues that balancing the equities in statutory cases
violates separation-of-powers principles. As a general matter, the
Court has employed two forms of analysis in separation-of-powers
cases: a formalist approach-which asks whether a challenged ac-
tion is characteristically legislative, judicial, or executive in nature
and therefore is constitutionally assigned to a particular branch-
and a functionalist approach-which examines whether a chal-
lenged action aggrandizes one branch's power."' The application of
"' Thus, even though equitable balancing has been justified by a fictitious history, it
is conceivable that Congress has come to expect courts to engage in it when applying
statutes authorizing injunctive relief. The preliminary injunction at issue in Winter was
issued pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), which empowers
courts to enjoin agencies from taking actions contrary to law but does not specify any
standards for courts to do so. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2006). Because the APA was en-
acted in 1946, after equitable balancing had become accepted as a factor for issuing
injunctions in common law actions, see supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text, it
ma be plausible to construe the APA to call for equitable balancing.
See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981) ("Past practice does not,
by itself, create power, but 'long-continued practice, known to and acquiesced in by
Congress, would raise a presumption that the [action] had been [taken] in pursuance
of its consent....') (quoting United States v. Midwest Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 474
(1915)); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610-11 (1952)
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (declaring that a long history of congressional acquies-
cence "may be treated as a gloss on 'executive Power' vested in the President by § 1 of
Art. II"); Michael J. Glennon, The Use of Custom in Resolving Separation of Powers
Disputes, 64 B.U. L. Rev. 109, 128-34 (1984); Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War,
2004 Sup. Ct. Rev. 47, 68 ("In the domain of separation of powers, historical practices
and changes over time are highly relevant.").
13 The formalist approach is typified by Justice Black's opinion for the Court in
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582-89; Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court in INS
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 923-59 (1983); and Justice Stevens' opinion for the Court in
Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 420-49 (1998). The functionalist approach
is typified by the concurring opinions of Justices Frankfurter and Jackson in Youngs-
town, 343 U.S. at 593-628, 634-55; the dissenting opinion of Justice White in Chadha,
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equitable balancing conflicts with separation-of-powers principles
under either approach. Once the false sheen of an ancient pedigree
is removed, the application of equitable balancing in statutory
cases can be seen for what it is: an assertion of naked judicial au-
thority to choose among competing federal policies. The interests
that courts balance in statutory contexts are not merely private in-
terests, as in common law cases, but are interests that Congress has
adopted and protected by statutes. Determining the relative prior-
ity of federal policies, such as the choice between national security
and environmental protection at issue in Winter, has long been
considered to be legislative in nature." The application of equita-
ble balancing in statutory cases likewise serves to aggrandize judi-
cial power at the expense of the political branches. That equitable
balancing serves to aggrandize judicial power can be seen in the
fact that the Court's assertion of policymaking power has not
proven to be neutral among congressional policies but instead
stacks the deck against some statutorily protected interests, espe-
cially environmental interests.
A. The Application of Equitable Balancing in Statutory Contexts
Involves Naked Policymaking Unrestrained by Law
The Supreme Court has long disclaimed freewheeling "policy-
making" authority, and it is curious that Justices who have been
among the most vocal critics of improper judicial policymaking
462 U.S. at 967-1003; and Justice Breyer's dissenting opinion in Clinton, 524 U.S. at
469-97. See generally Peter L. Strauss, Formal and Functional Approaches to Separa-
tion-of-Powers Questions-A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72 Cornell L. Rev. 488, 489
(1987) (describing the Court's vacillation between formalist and functionalist ap-
proaches to separation-of-powers issues).
'13 See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 194 (1978) (declaring that it is "emphatically.. .
the exclusive province of the Congress not only to formulate legislative policies and
mandate programs and projects, but also to establish their relative priority for the Na-
tion"); Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974) ("[C]ourts are not at liberty to
pick and choose among congressional enactments. . . .").
' See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 382 (1989) ("[C]oncern of en-
croachment and aggrandizement ... has animated our separation-of-powers jurispru-
dence .... ); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 122 (1976) (declaring that the checks and
balances inherent in our separation-of-powers scheme serve as a "safeguard against
the encroachment or aggrandizement of one branch at the expense of the other").
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have also been the strongest supporters of equitable balancing."6
Chief Justice Rehnquist, who criticized non-originalism as giving
judges a "roving commission to second-guess Congress, state legis-
latures, and state and federal administrative officers concerning
what is best for the country,"137 nonetheless was the sole Justice
who supported the application of equitable balancing in TVA v.
Hill and thought that it was his job to decide whether building a
dam or saving a fish was best for the country."" Chief Justice Rob-
erts, who famously testified that judges should act not like policy-
makers but "like umpires," wrote the opinion for the Court in Win-
ter, which held that national security concerns trump
environmental protections."' Joining Roberts's opinion in Winter
were Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, who have criticized bal-
ancing tests in constitutional cases as improper judicial policymak-
ing and strongly rejected any judicial policymaking role."
Of course, just as the Court has characterized its lack of policy-
making power to be a "truism," so too have most academics dis-
missed the Court's rejection of judicial policymaking authority as
disingenuous.14 1 The Court regularly establishes "policy" in several
1 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) ("Courts must,
in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not on the basis of the
judges' personal policy preferences."); TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 194 (declaring that it
is "emphatically ... the exclusive province of the Congress not only to formulate leg-
islative policies and mandate programs and projects, but also to establish their relative
priority for the Nation."); Local 1976, United Bhd. of Carpenters v. NLRB, 357 U.S.
93, 100 (1958) (discussing "the truism that it is the business of Congress to declare
policy and not this Court's").
' William H. Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 Tex. L. Rev. 693,
698 (1976).
'3 See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 211-13.
131 Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. To Be Chief
Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th
Cong. 55 (2005).
'See Dep't of Revenue of Ky. v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1821 (2008) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (describing judicial balancing in dormant commerce clause cases as re-
quiring "quintessentially legislative judgments"); United Haulers Ass'n v. Oneida-
Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330, 349 (2007) (Thomas, J., concur-
ring) (rejecting a balancing test on the ground that it "turns solely on policy consid-
erations"); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to Be an
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 360 (2006) ("We are not policymakers and we
shouldn't be implementing any sort of policy agenda or policy preferences .... ).
141 Compare NLRB, 357 U.S. at 100 (discussing "the truism that it is the business of
Congress to declare policy and not this Court's"), with Anne Bloom, The "Post-
[Vol. 96:485518
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senses of the term.142 Courts make fundamental policy choices in
construing the Constitution, which entails determining the extent
of national and state power in such areas as affirmative action,
abortion, and marriage. Statutory construction, too, necessarily in-
volves a degree of judicial lawmaking, as courts must fill in gaps
and resolve ambiguities, tasks that are frequently guided by policy
concerns.'43 in various contexts, federal courts have power to fash-
ion federal common law, which, like the creation of state common
law, undoubtedly amounts to judicial legislation."
Notwithstanding the reality of judicial policymaking, the Court's
rejection of policymaking authority expresses a central principle
grounded in a formalist conception of separation of powers: the na-
ture of judicial actions, unlike actions by the political branches,
must be guided by articulable legal principles. As Justice Scalia has
explained:
I am not so naive (nor do I think our forebears were) as to be
unaware that judges in a real sense "make" law. But they make it
as judges make it, which is to say as though they were "finding"
it-discerning what the law is, rather than decreeing what it is
today changed to, or what it will tomorrow be.'45
Attitudinal Moment": Judicial Policymaking Through the Lens of New Institutional-
ism, 35 Law & Soc'y Rev. 219, 219 (2001) ("In the last several decades, the view that
American judges are policymakers has become all but axiomatic among political sci-
entists.").
142 See, e.g., Malcolm M. Feeley & Edward L. Rubin, Judicial Policy Making and the
Modem State: How the Courts Reformed America's Prisons 5 (1998) (defining poli-
cymaking as the "exercise [of] power" by officials "on the basis of their judgment that
their actions will produce socially desirable results").
'1 See Guido Calabresi, A Common Law for the Age of Statutes 2 (1982); Richard
A. Posner, Overcoming Law 229-36 (1995); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 Stan. L. Rev. 321, 345
(1990).
'" See Thomas W. Merrill, The Common Law Powers of Federal Courts, 52 U. Chi.
L. Rev. 1, 3-4 (1985); Jay Tidmarsh & Brian J. Murray, A Theory of Federal Com-
mon Law, 100 Nw. U. L. Rev. 585, 586-87 (2006). But see Martin H. Redish, Federal
Common Law, Political Legitimacy, and the Interpretive Process: An "Institutional-
ist" Perspective, 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 761, 766-67 (1989) (arguing that federal common
law violates separation-of-powers principles because it is essentially a legislative task).
1' James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529, 549 (1991) (Scalia, J., con-
curring) (emphasis omitted); see also Posner, supra note 143, at 235 ("Everyone pro-
fessionally involved with law knows that, as Holmes put it, judges legislate 'intersti-
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Judicial decisions that cannot be justified in terms of legal rules do
not conform to rule-of-law principles. As Alexander Hamilton
wrote in The Federalist No. 78, "to avoid an arbitrary discretion in
the courts, it is indispensable that they should be bound down by
strict rules and precedents, which serve to define and point out
their duty in every particular case that comes before them ....
Or as Justice Scalia more succinctly put it, the "rule of law" means
the "law of rules." 147 Under this conception, improper judicial poli-
cymaking occurs when judges decide cases unguided by legal
rules.148
As the next two sections demonstrate, the application of equita-
ble balancing in statutory cases amounts to exactly the sort of na-
ked judicial policymaking that the Justices comprising the Winter
majority have long criticized. It requires judges to choose between
competing policy interests based on their own view of the strengths
of the competing interests, without any rule, standard, or principle
to guide their discretion.
1. Balancing the Equities in Statutory Cases Requires Courts to
Choose Between Federal Policies
When courts balance the equities in statutory cases, the interests
on each side of the case are usually, if not always, supported by
congressional policies. Yet equitable balancing provides courts no
guidance for choosing between these policy interests. The Supreme
Court has elided the problem that in statutory cases balancing the
equities means balancing competing policies by portraying what it
is doing as merely balancing the parties' interests, declaring that
"courts 'must balance the competing claims of injury and must con-
tially,' which is to say they make law, only more cautiously, more slowly, and in more
principled, less partisan, fashion than legislators.").
" The Federalist No. 78, at 430 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898).47 Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1175
(1989).
"'In this way, the principle against judicial policymaking is akin to the nondelega-
tion doctrine, under which executive agencies can legitimately exercise legislative
power if they are guided by "intelligible principle[s]." See Whitman v. Am. Trucking
Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (citing J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276
U.S. 394, 409 (1928)). See generally Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judi-
cially Administered Statutes and the Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. Cal. L. Rev. 405,
473-76 (2008).
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sider the effect on each party of the granting or withholding of the
requested relief.""49 In Winter, the Court thus identified the com-
peting interests as "the Navy's ability to conduct realistic training
exercises" and the "plaintiffs' ability to study and observe"
whales.' The Court then purported to compare the strength of the
Navy's interests in training sailors against the plaintiffs' interests in
going whale watching, concluding that it is obvious that the Navy's
interest is weightier.' In framing the preliminary injunction deci-
sion as weighing merely the parties' competing claims of injury, the
Court has sought to characterize equitable balancing as it devel-
oped in common law cases, which also focused on the particular in-
terests of the parties.'52
Yet the interests at stake in cases like Winter differ fundamen-
tally from the interests at stake in common law cases because, in
the statutory context, the competing interests are protected by
statutes. It is not merely the Winter plaintiffs who wanted to pro-
tect whales; Congress's purpose in enacting NEPA was to protect
the natural environment.153 The plaintiffs in Winter were entitled to
go to federal court to protect their interests in the environment
only because Congress concluded that authorizing private suits
would help fulfill the purposes for which it enacted NEPA.m By
the same token, the Secretary of the Navy did not act on his own in
deciding to train sailors in antisubmarine warfare; Congress had di-
rected him to train sailors.' Congressional policies thus lay on
both sides of the balance of equities. To "balance the competing
claims of injury" in Winter means balancing competing congres-
sional purposes-Congress's goal of protecting the environment by
requiring environmental impact statements and Congress's goal of
' Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 376 (2008) (quoting Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell,
480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987)).
150 Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 377-78.
's' Id. at 378.
'" See, e.g., Restatement (Second) of Torts § 941 (1979).
"42 U.S.C. § 4321 (2006) (declaring the congressional purpose "to promote efforts
which will prevent or eliminate damage to the environment and biosphere").
'" See 5 U.S.C § 702 (2006) (providing a cause of action to any "person suffering le-
gal wrong because of agency action"); 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2006) (requiring that federal
agencies comply with NEPA).
' See 10 U.S.C. § 5062(d) (2006) (directing that "[t]he Navy shall develop aircraft,
weapons, tactics, technique, organization, and equipment of naval combat and service
elements").
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ensuring that Navy personnel are properly trained."' In contrast, in
common law contexts, the courts, not the legislature, have deter-
mined which policy interests are relevant and thus there is no sepa-
ration-of-powers problem when courts compare the relative weight
of these judicially recognized interests.
Every statutory case in which the Court has addressed equitable
balancing arose out of apparent conflicts between federal policies.
In TVA v. Hill, Congress had appropriated $100 million for the
construction of the Tellico Dam, which would have eliminated the
darter fish, and had also prohibited all federal agencies from taking
actions that jeopardize endangered species."' Deciding whether to
enjoin construction of the dam was tantamount to deciding which
of these two congressional commands-build the dam or save the
fish-should take priority. The Court concluded that it could not
decide the case by "balancing" the competing statutory interests.'58
As the Court concluded, Congress had authority to decide between
saving the fish or building the dam; the Court's task was limited to
' To be sure, the Court in these cases discusses how the "public interest" would be
affected by an injunction, but consideration of the public interest is understood to be
a trump factor independent of the balance of equities. The standard formulation of
the test for injunctive relief requires courts to consider the "public interest" in addi-
tion to considering the balance of equities. See, e.g., 13 James Wm. Moore et al.,
Moore's Federal Practice 1 65.22[3] (Matthew Bender 3d ed. 2009). Yet the conven-
tional formulation of the public interest factor allows the public interest to be used to
restrain the issuance of an injunction, not to justify it. As the Supreme Court recently
explained, "[a]ccording to well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a
permanent injunction must [demonstrate] ... that the public interest would not be dis-
served by a permanent injunction." eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388,
391 (2006) (emphasis added). The public interest has never been understood as a fac-
tor that can justify an injunction when the balance of equities does not. In any event,
the Court's identification of the relevant public interests is easily manipulated. In
Amoco, the Court considered the public interest in oil development but not in pro-
tecting resources for native Alaskan subsistence. See Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of
Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545-46 (1987). In Winter, the Court considered the public's
interest in national security, but not the public's interest in protecting whales or in
having the government make decisions informed by environmental analysis. See 129
S. Ct. at 378.
"' See Public Works Appropriation Act, 1967, Pub. L. No. 89-689, 80 Stat. 1002,
1014 (1966) (appropriating money to construct Tellico Dam); 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2)
(2006).
'"TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 187-88 (1978) ("Quite obviously, it would be difficult
for a court to balance the loss of a sum certain-even $100 million-against a con-
gressionally declared 'incalculable' value, even assuming we had the power to engage
in such a weighing process, which we emphatically do not.").
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attempting to discern the priority Congress had assigned between
these competing interests, not deciding the policy issue itself.
By portraying equitable balancing as involving merely a choice
between the parties' competing interests, the Court hides that what
it is really doing is choosing between competing statutory interests.
In the line of cases in which the Court has addressed how apparent
conflicts between statutes should be resolved, however, the Court
has recognized that separation-of-powers principles do not allow
judges to resolve such conflicts based on their own preferences
among the competing statutory interests: "The courts are not at
liberty to pick and choose among congressional enactments. . . .""
Rather than deciding which statute they prefer, courts must resolve
apparent conflicts between statutes by attempting to discern con-
gressional intent through ordinary principles of statutory construc-
tion, reading statutes to be consistent where possible, and, where
harmonization is not possible, applying the later-enacted statute, a
rule that gives preference to Congress's last word." In contrast, in
the cases in which it has applied equitable balancing, the Court has
simply announced its conviction that one set of statutory interests
(national security in Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo and Winter, oil
development in Amoco Production Co. v. Village of Gambell) is
more important than another set of statutory interests (protection
of the natural environment). Separation-of-powers principles dic-
tate that these policy choices are for Congress to make, not the
courts.
2. No Principles Guide Courts in Balancing the Equities in Statutory
Cases
The Court's decision to resolve the conflicts in Romero-Barcelo,
Amoco, and Winter by purporting to balance the parties' interests,
while in reality choosing between competing statutory policies,
might not be so troubling if the Court had established a neutral and
coherent basis for balancing the competing statutory interests. No
rules or even guiding principles have developed, however, for how
courts should balance the equities in deciding whether to enjoin
statutory violations. Equitable balancing simply instructs judges
" Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974).
"See infra notes 224-27 and accompanying text.
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that they may issue an injunction if they think it will do more good
than harm, but the instruction to do good rather than bad is no
rule.16' Equitable balancing thus empowers courts to pick the statu-
tory interests they consider most important based on their own pol-
icy preferences.
Even in common law contexts, no principles have developed to
guide the application of any of the key elements of equitable bal-
ancing-the determination of whose interests should be balanced,
what interests should be balanced, and what weight the competing
interests should be assigned.62 As one treatise declares, "[i]n bal-
ancing the equities ... the court is not bound by a formula but is
free to fashion relief molded to the needs of justice." 163 The absence
of any formal principles for guiding the balance of equities is not
merely this author's criticism; it derives from the nature of equity,
which courts frequently assert eschews formal rules:
The essence of equity jurisdiction has been the power of the
Chancellor to do equity and to mould each decree to the necessi-
ties of the particular case. Flexibility rather than rigidity has dis-
tinguished it. The qualities of mercy and practicality have made
equity the instrument for nice adjustment and reconciliation be-
tween the public interest and private needs as well as between
competing private claims.'"
The absence of any standard to guide the balance of equities has
led to what one commentator has described as a "dizzying diversity
of formulations," employed to describe how courts balance the eq-
uities.' Some courts declare that they only consider the interests of
the parties, while other courts also consider the interests of the
public.' Of the courts that consider the public interest, some weigh
6' See, e.g., Katie R. Eyer, Administrative Adjudication and the Rule of Law, 60
Admin. L. Rev. 647, 662 (2008) ("[I]t would be difficult to characterize a legal system
as even properly possessing legal rules . .. in the context of limitless government dis-
cretion.").
16 Equitable balancing is akin to the balancing tests adopted in constitutional cases,
about which Professor Aleinikoff concluded that "[n]o system of identification,
evaluation, and comparison of interests has been developed." Aleinikoff, supra note
21, at 982.
'63 See 27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 78 (2008).
'6 Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 329, 329-30 (1944).
'
6 Leubsdorf, supra note 22, at 526.
'6 Id.
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only the harm that an injunction would cause the public, while
other courts also consider the benefits that the public would receive
from an injunction.167
Just as no rules or principles have developed for deciding what
interests should be balanced, no rules or principles have developed
to guide courts in comparing them. Courts are free to balance the
competing interests as they see fit, considering only the "needs of
justice," broadly defined." For instance, the court in Madison v.
Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co. declined to issue an injunc-
tion after concluding that it was more important to allow a smelting
plant to continue operating than to protect the interests of individ-
ual property owners affected by the plant." The Court in Winter
likewise overturned an injunction against Navy training exercises
alleged to harm whales after simply asserting that national security
is more important than whale watching."' In other cases, courts
have sought to resolve whether it is more important to protect jobs
or the environment."' No principles govern how much weight
courts should assign competing interests in economic protection,
environmental protection, or national security. Instead, judges
simply make ad hoc judgments on how much environmental pro-
tection they believe should be sacrificed for national security, or
how many jobs they can accept should be lost to protect the envi-
ronment. In doing so, courts do not usually articulate the value
judgments upon which they make their decisions. Winter simply
declared that the choice between national security and whale
watching "does not strike us as a close question," 72 while Duck-
town Sulphur similarly declared, in choosing between protecting
industrial development and protecting private property, "[w]e
"' Id. ("Sometimes the injunction must not disserve the public interest, sometimes it
must serve the public interest, and sometimes only the equities of the parties count.");
David S. Schoenbrod, The Measure of an Injunction: A Principle to Replace Balanc-
ing the Equities and Tailoring the Remedy, 72 Minn. L. Rev. 627, 637 n.42 (1988).
See 27A Am. Jur. 2d Equity § 78 (2008).
See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
no Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 382.
.' See Lands Council v. McNair, 537 F.3d 981, 1004-05 (9th Cir. 2008); State ex rel.
Guste v. Lee, 635 F. Supp. 1107, 1127 (E.D. La. 1986) ("In essence, the court is faced
with the public's interest in the environment on the one hand, and the public's interest
in reventing the demise of a 50-year old industry on the other.").
Winter. 129 S. Ct. at 378.
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think there can be no doubt as to what the true answer to this ques-
tion should be.",73
The application of equitable balancing in statutory contexts
raises separation-of-powers problems not merely because it re-
quires judges to weigh competing policy interests without stan-
dards but because the interests at stake are often seemingly inc-
ommensurable or at least deeply problematic for judges to
compare.174 There is no consensus or common metric by which the
value of environmental protection, economic development, or na-
tional security can be compared. As discussed in Part I, some
courts resisted equitable balancing in common law nuisance cases
because they considered the values at stake-property rights and
economic interests-to be incomparable. These courts resolved the
incommensurability problem by declaring that one set of inter-
ests-property rights-was absolute and could not be reduced to
economic terms.'7 1 In TVA v. Hill, the Supreme Court resolved the
incommensurability problem in a similar fashion by concluding
that Congress had declared endangered species to have "incalcula-
ble" value, thus barring courts from comparing the value of the
snail darter with a $100 million dam project."'7 In later cases, how-
ever, the Court has overcome the concern that it would be inap-
propriate for a court to compare the value of federal projects
against other federally protected interests."' The Court has pro-
" Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper & Iron Co., 83 S.W. 658, 666-67 (1904).
'7 Professor Cass Sunstein has said that an interest is incommensurable if we cannot
price it without "doing violence to our considered judgments about how these goods
are best characterized." Cass R. Sunstein, Free Markets and Social Justice 80 (1997).
For general discussions of the problems of incommensurability, see Brett G. Scharffs,
Adjudication and the Problems of Incommensurability, 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1367
(2001); Frederick Schauer, Instrumental Commensurability, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1215
(1998); Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 Mich. L. Rev.
779 (1994); Jeremy Waldron, Fake Incommensurability: A Response to Professor
Schauer, 45 Hastings L.J. 813 (1994).
' See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text; see also Bone, supra note 22, at
1135-226 (tracing the demise of the theory of absolute property rights).
"' 437 U.S. 153, 187-88 (1978).
'" Amoco thus expresses no qualms about judicial balancing of the value of natural
resources used by native Alaskans for subsistence against the economic value of oil
exploration, Amoco Prod. Co. v. Vill. of Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 545 (1987), and Win-
ter does not hesitate to compare the value of antisubmarine training against the value
of whales alleged to be harmed by that training, Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 377-78 (2008).
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vided no description of the scale it employs to compare such val-
ues.
In contrast, Justice Scalia and others have strongly criticized the
use of balancing tests in constitutional cases because they give
courts no criteria other than their own preferences for identifying
and weighing the relevant interests at stake, allowing judges to
base their decisions on their own values."' As Justice Scalia has as-
serted, "you cannot decide which interest 'outweighs' the other
without deciding which interest is more important to you.""'7 The
same criticism applies equally when courts balance interests in
statutory contexts. Judicial balancing in statutory contexts, no less
than in constitutional contexts, can properly be characterized as
legislative in nature because it requires comparison of seemingly
incommensurable values and therefore lies beyond judicial compe-
tence.'"
'78 Aleinikoff, supra note 21, at 972 ("A frequent criticism of balancing is that the
Court has no objective criteria for valuing or comparing the interests at stake.").
"' Dep't of Revenue v. Davis, 128 S. Ct. 1801, 1821 (2008) (Scalia, J., concurring in
part); see also Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 987 (1992)
(Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that the
"undue burden" test "conceal[s] raw judicial policy choices concerning what is 'ap-
propriate' abortion legislation"); Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486
U.S. 888, 897 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Weighing the governmental interests of
a State against the needs of interstate commerce is ... a task squarely within the re-
sponsibility of Congress ... and 'ill suited to the judicial function."'); Aleinikoff, supra
note 21, at 973 ("The balancer's scale cannot simply represent the personal prefer-
ences of the balancer, lest constitutional law become the arbitrary act of will today
characterized as 'lochnering."').
' For instance, in District of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2821 (2008), the
Supreme Court rejected an interest-balancing approach to determine the scope of the
Second Amendment, concluding that the balance of competing interests had already
been conducted by the Framers of the Constitution on behalf of the people. The
Court declared that the Amendment "is the very product of an interest-balancing by
the people-which Justice Breyer would now conduct for them anew." See also
Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 75 (1970) (Black, J., concurring) ("Those who
wrote and adopted our Constitution and Bill of Rights engaged in all the balancing
necessary."). See generally Laurent B. Frantz, The First Amendment in the Balance,
71 Yale L.J. 1424, 1443-44 (1962) (discussing dispute between First Amendment bal-
ancers and literalists); Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute,
1961 Sup. Ct. Rev. 245, 246-52 (1961).
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B. Equitable Balancing Allows Courts to Undermine Statutory
Policies
Balancing the equities in common law cases does not threaten to
step on the toes of the legislature because the judiciary is the
source of the common law. When courts balance the equities in de-
ciding whether to enjoin violations of federal statutes, however,
they are acting in a realm in which Congress has declared the rele-
vant policies, dictated standards for conduct, and authorized in-
junctions for violations of those standards. Congress presumably
examined the various interests at stake and determined the appro-
priate balance of interests."' When courts decline to enjoin viola-
tions of federal statutes based on their assessments of the balance
of equities, they effectively second-guess congressional policies, ex-
cusing statutory violations because they consider other policies
more important than correcting the violation.182 This sort of judicial
second-guessing is precisely what equitable balancing has meant in
environmental cases, the primary statutory area in which the Court
has applied the doctrine. In Romero-Barcelo, Amoco, and Winter,
the Court expressed its own judgment that the interests served by
the environmental statutes are not as weighty as other statutory in-
terests, such as oil development and national security.
To understand how equitable balancing allows courts to under-
mine the policies of the environmental statutes, it is necessary
briefly to summarize two of those policies. First, federal environ-
mental laws express a congressional conclusion that environmental
destruction causes harm to a diffuse set of interests." Under the
common law, environmental destruction was prohibited only to the
' See, e.g., NASA v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 527 U.S. 229, 245 (1999) ("We
must presume, however, that Congress took account of the policy concerns on both
sides of the balance when it decided to enact the IGA .... ").
"2 See Schoenbrod, supra note 167, at 635 ("It is not at all clear how balancing the
equities differs, if at all, from second-guessing the decisions of legislators or others
who laid down the law of liability.").
'8 As many scholars have noted, the statutory environmental regime reflects Con-
gress's recognition of the unique nature of environmental harms. See, e.g., Richard J.
Lazarus, Restoring What's Environmental About Environmental Law in the Supreme
Court, 47 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 703, 744 (2000) ("What makes environmental law distinc-
tive is largely traceable to the nature of the injury that environmental protection law
seeks to reduce, minimize, or sometimes prevent altogether."); Albert C. Lin, The
Unifying Role of Harm in Environmental Law, 2006 Wis. L. Rev. 897, 907-08 (2006).
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extent that it caused injury to traditionally protected interests, lim-
ited principally to property interests." In enacting the modern en-
vironmental statutes, Congress concluded that the common law did
not adequately protect the environment in part because it did not
recognize the unique nature of environmental harm: environ-
mental injury is often physically and temporally distant from the
harmful action; environmental destruction often causes none-
conomic injury, such as harm to aesthetic or recreational interests;
and environmental destruction can harm interests that are nonhu-
man, such as plants, animals, and ecosystems, wholly separate from
any harm to people."' Second, the federal environmental statutes
embody a policy of risk prevention, under which activities that cre-
ate significant risks of environmental harm, and not merely activi-
ties that actually cause harm, are prohibited." By preventing acts
that carry risks of environmental destruction, the modern envi-
ronmental statutes adopt a much more precautionary approach
than the common law, which restrained action only upon proof of
actual harm."
' See, e.g., Wood, supra note 66, § 789, at 1157 (noting that equity will not issue an
injunction unless the complainant demonstrates "actual injury to the property, or to
its comfortable enjoyment").
185 See Lazarus, supra note 183, at 745-46, 748.
'" Id. at 747 (explaining that due to the uncertainties associated with preventing en-
vironmental injury "[t]he inevitable upshot is that environmental laws that seek to
prevent harm are directed to risk rather than to actual impact"). For instance, the
Clean Air Act directs EPA to set ambient air quality standards at a level which, "al-
lowing an adequate margin of safety, are requisite to protect the public health." 42
U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2006); see also Toxic Substances Control Act of 1976, 15 U.S.C.
§ 2605(a) (2006) (allowing EPA to prohibit chemicals that pose an "unreasonable risk
of injury to health or the environment"); Clean Water Act § 307(a)(4), 33 U.S.C.
§ 1317(a)(4) (2006) (requiring that effluent standards for toxic pollutants promulgated
under Clean Water Act shall provide "an ample margin of safety"); Safe Drinking
Water Act § 1412, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(3)(D)(4) (2006) (requiring that maximum
drinking water contaminants "shall be set at a level at which no known or anticipated
adverse effects on the health of persons occur and which allows an adequate margin
of safety").
1 See Robert V. Percival, Responding to Environmental Risk: A Pluralistic Per-
spective, 14 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 513, 515 (1997) ("The pervasiveness of uncertainty
concerning the ultimate effects of environmental pollutants and toxins is the primary
reason why the contemporary regulatory state displaced the common law as the first
line of defense for public health. The common law's requirement of individualized
proof of causal injury is very difficult to satisfy in cases where environmental pollut-
ants cause widely dispersed, latent harm.").
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In the paradigmatic case of air pollution from a factory, the
common law of nuisance allows the pollution to be challenged only
to the extent that it can be demonstrated to cause harm to property
interests. In contrast, the statutory regime created by the Clean Air
Act recognizes that air pollution creates a risk of a much wider
range of harms, including illness, diminished recreational opportu-
nities, reduced enjoyment of the natural world, harm to plants,
animals, and ecosystems; and it recognizes that these effects may
be felt today or many years from now, both near the source of pol-
lution and far away.l" To reduce the risk of such harms, Congress
authorized the establishment of air pollution thresholds, above
which pollution created a significant risk of causing environmental
harm.l" Congress also authorized suits by any plaintiff who can al-
lege harm to any of these widely dispersed interests, including rec-
reational and aesthetic interests that previously did not receive le-
gal recognition." The Supreme Court ruled early on that Congress
constitutionally can create standing for harm to personal, yet
widely dispersed, interests."'
'" See Shi-Ling Hsu, The Identifiability Bias in Environmental Law, 35 Fla. St. U. L.
Rev. 433, 466 (2008) ("For most environmental or ecological harms, which tend to be
widespread and diffuse, it is difficult to identify a specific plaintiff or group of persons
whom have suffered 'concrete and particularized' harm."); James Krier, Environ-
mental Watchdogs: Some Lessons from a "Study" Council, 23 Stan. L. Rev. 623, 664
(1971) (noting the breadth and diffusion of environmental risks); Lin, supra note 183,
at 908 ("[C]ommon law tort provides neither sufficient redress for widespread harms
nor adequate mechanisms for anticipatory intervention. To address these shortcom-
ings, the legal system turned to public law-legal structures based on statutes and
administrative regulations."); Percival, supra note 187, at 515 ("The rise of the mod-
ern regulatory state is largely a product of the difficulties faced by the common law in
responding to risks of widely dispersed, latent harm, such as the harms caused by en-
vironmental pollutants and toxins.").
'"42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (2006); see also Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531
U.S. 457, 494-96 (2001) (Breyer, J., concurring) (discussing the scope of EPA's au-
thority to determine air quality standards based on considerations of risk).
'" The citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act, for instance, provides a cause
of action to anyone "having an interest which is or may be adversely affected" by an
alleged statutory violation. 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1)-(2), (g) (2006). The citizen suit
provisions of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(1) (2006), and Clean
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604 (2006), employ similarly broad language.
... Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972) ("[T]he fact that particular envi-
ronmental interests are shared by the many rather than the few does not make them
less deserving of legal protection through the judicial process.").
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The Court's application of equitable balancing in environmental
cases conflicts with both of these sets of statutory policies. First,
equitable balancing suggests that the diffuse interests protected by
the environmental statutes will not be taken seriously when it
comes to granting remedies. Indeed, equitable balancing empow-
ers, if not requires, courts to discount those interests. As applied in
Winter, equitable balancing only takes into account the interests of
the particular parties, weighing the interests of the plaintiffs in re-
ceiving an injunction against the interests of the defendants in not
being enjoined. Environmental harm carries no weight independ-
ent of its effects on the parties. The potential harm to whales fac-
tors into the balance of equities only to the extent that harm to
whales might deprive the plaintiffs of opportunities to go whale
watching and make nature documentaries." Not only does the
Court disregard any intrinsic value environmental resources may
have, the Court likewise does not consider the effects that a loss of
whales might have on anyone other than the plaintiffs. Yet a cen-
tral premise of the environmental statutes is that the harm from
environmentally destructive conduct is distributed among species,
among the human population, and across time.
Once the intrinsic value of the natural world and the interests of
non-parties are excluded from the balance of equities, the interests
that remain on the plaintiffs' side-in Winter, the plaintiffs' inter-
ests in going whale watching and making nature documentaries-
are likely to appear so trivial as to be laughable.193 Just as the Win-
ter plaintiffs' interest in whale watching seems trivial, the same was
true in TVA v. Hill. Whatever interest the Hill plaintiffs had in the
continued existence of snail darters-perhaps the interest in enjoy-
ing the river in a condition in which native wildlife was present-
'" Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 375, 378 (2008) (agreeing with the Navy that "even if MFA
sonar does cause a limited number of injuries to individual marine mammals,...
plaintiffs have failed to offer evidence of species-level harm that would adversely af-
fect their scientific, recreational, and ecological interests"); see also Friends of the
Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Serv., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 181 (2000) ("The relevant show-
ing for purposes of Article III standing, however, is not injury to the environment but
injury to the plaintiff."). See generally Lin, supra note 183, at 936 ("The Supreme
Court's standing cases, however, have insisted on finding harm to humans, and not
just harm to the environment.").
"' When the Court stated that "we do not question the seriousness" of the interests
on the plaintiffs' side, one can almost hear the Justices trying to suppress their laugh-
ter at the weakness of those interests. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 378.
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can only be seen to pale in comparison to the value of a $100 mil-
lion hydroelectric project. Yet as Congress recognized in enacting
the federal environmental statutes, environmental destruction
causes much broader injury than the injury to particular plaintiffs.
The loss of whales affects not only the plaintiffs, who want to see
whales; there are the interests of all affected whale watchers and
documentarians; of oceanographers and marine mammal special-
ists; of future generations who would like to enjoy and study
whales, perhaps even hunt them; as well as the widely diffused in-
terests of everyone who benefits from healthy ocean ecosystems;
and finally, there are the interests of the whales themselves, and all
affected nonhuman creatures.19
In contrast to the widely dispersed costs imposed by environ-
mental destruction, the benefits from a defendant's destructive ac-
tivities are often much more concentrated. Considering again the
paradigmatic case of a polluting factory, the benefits from not in-
stalling pollution controls accrue primarily to the factory owners,
who save money they would have spent on pollution controls, in-
creasing their efficiency and profits, while the harms from pollution
are dispersed widely."' Because of the diffuse nature of environ-
mental harm, injury to an individual plaintiff will often be small in
comparison to the benefits from the harmful activity. Equitable
" See, e.g., NEPA, 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (2006) (directing that federal agencies "use
all practicable means" to "assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and
esthetically and culturally pleasing surroundings" and to "preserve important historic,
cultural, and natural aspects of our national heritage, and maintain, wherever possi-
ble, an environment which supports diversity and variety of individual choice"); Ma-
rine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (2006) (declaring that "marine mam-
mals have proven themselves to be resources of great international significance,
esthetic and recreational as well as economic, and it is the sense of the Congress that
they should be protected and encouraged to develop to the greatest extent feasible
commensurate with sound policies of resource management and that the primary ob-
jective of their management should be to maintain the health and stability of the ma-
rine ecosystem.").
" The court in Ducktown Sulphur thus asked how it could justify shutting down a
factory that generated millions of dollars and employed hundreds of people in order
to address the interests of a few dirt farmers. Madison v. Ducktown Sulphur, Copper
& Iron Co., 83 S.W. 658, 666-67 (Tenn. 1904). In fact, the widespread environmental
destruction caused by the smelting operation was felt in both Tennessee and Georgia
and continues to plague the area today. Giehyeon Lee et al., Removal of Trace Met-
als by Coprecipitation with Fe, Al, and Mn from Natural Waters Contaminated with
Acid Mine Drainage in the Ducktown Mining District, Tennessee, 17 Applied Geo-
chemistry 569 (2002).
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balancing tips the balance against environmental interests by re-
quiring a court to consider the concentrated benefits to defendants
from environmentally destructive behavior (and as a corollary, the
concentrated costs of preventing that destruction), while allowing
courts to discount the widely dispersed costs from environmental
destruction (and as a corollary, the dispersed benefits from pre-
venting that destruction).
This discussion is not intended to suggest that a proper weighing
of costs and benefits in Winter would lead to a different result. It is
hard to quibble with the Court's conclusion that the needs of na-
tional security outweigh the need to protect whales. Instead, what I
have tried to show is that Congress sought to protect widely dis-
persed interests in enacting the environmental laws, but Winter un-
dermines that objective by ruling that such widely diffused injuries
do not count when it comes to obtaining a remedy." Under the
guise of applying the balance of equities, the Court has effectively
expressed its disagreement with the congressional policy of pro-
tecting widely dispersed harms, or at a minimum it has disregarded
that policy.
Just as equitable balancing undermines the congressional policy
of protecting widely dispersed harms, equitable balancing also con-
flicts with the statutory policy of preventing actions that carry risks
of environmental destruction and not merely actions that cause ac-
tual destruction. Romero-Barcelo and Amoco establish that the
balance of equities can tip in favor of an injunction only upon
proof of actual environmental degradation, and Winter holds that
1 It might be argued that the traditional test for injunctive relief could consider
widely disbursed harms through the consideration of the "public interest." Indeed, the
standard formulation of the test for injunctive relief requires courts to consider the
"public interest" in addition to considering the balance of equities. See, e.g., 13 Moore
et al., supra note 156, T 65.22[3] (identifying the factors courts should consider in issu-
ing a preliminary injunction to include whether the injunction will disserve the public
interest). Yet, as discussed supra in note 156, the conventional formulation of the
public interest factor allows the public interest to be used to restrain the issuance of an
injunction, not to justify it. As the Supreme Court recently explained: "According to
well-established principles of equity, a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must
[demonstrate] ... that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent in-
junction." eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (emphasis
added). The public interest has never been understood as a factor that can justify an
injunction when the balance of equities does not.
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proof of environmental harm is not always sufficient.'" Yet the en-
vironmental statutes mandate action based on assessments of risk,
not proof of harm.198 Congress addressed risk rather than harm be-
cause of the uncertainties associated with predicting environmental
injuries, and because the consequences of environmental destruc-
tion are often catastrophic and irreversible.'" Yet in applying equi-
table balancing the Supreme Court has disagreed with Congress
and concluded that injunctions should be issued for violations of
the environmental statutes only upon proof that an injunction is
necessary to prevent actual harm. Risk was enough for Congress,
but it is not for the Court.
To be sure, the Court has repeatedly declared that equitable
balancing cannot be employed to express judicial disagreement
with statutory policies, but it is hard to know what to make of these
declarations.2 o Notwithstanding such pronouncements, Romero-
Barcelo held that the balance of equities precluded an injunction to
stop the Navy from violating the Clean Water Act, Amoco held
that the balance of equities precluded an injunction against the
Department of the Interior for violating the Alaska National Inter-
est Lands Conservation Act, and Winter held that the balance of
equities precluded an injunction to stop the Navy from violating
the National Environmental Policy Act.201 In each of these cases,
the Court excused statutory violations because the Court con-
" See supra notes 102-30 and accompanying text.
198 See supra note 186 and accompanying text.
See Lazarus, supra note 183, at 747.
' United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers' Coop., 532 U.S. 493, 497 (2001)
("Courts of equity cannot, in their discretion, reject the balance that Congress has
struck in a statute."); see also id. at 497-98 (stating that a district court's choice in the
face of a proven statutory violation "is simply whether a particular means of enforcing
the statute should be chosen over another permissible means; their choice is not
whether enforcement is preferable to no enforcement at all"); Youngstown Sheet &
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 609-10 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("When
Congress itself has struck the balance, has defined the weight to be given the compet-
ing interests, a court of equity is not justified in ignoring that pronouncement under
the guise of exercising equitable discretion."); United States v. City of S.F., 310 U.S.
16, 31 (1940) ("The equitable doctrines relied on do not militate against the capacity
of a court of equity as a proper forum in which to make a declared policy of Congress
effective.").
"0 According to Professor Plater, Romero-Barcelo is the first case when a court em-
ployed equitable balancing to override a statutory prohibition. Plater, supra note 27,
at 594.
Equitable Balancing
cluded that other federal policies outweighed the policies served by
these statutes.
Professor Daniel Farber has sought to reconcile what the Court
has said about the separation-of-powers-based limits on equitable
balancing with what it did in Romero-Barcelo by suggesting that
the Court only allowed the government to continue its statutory
noncompliance temporarily while it attempted to come into com-
pliance.2 ' Under this interpretation, Romero-Barcelo is a statutory
cousin of Brown v. Board of Education II, in which the Court re-
jected the plaintiffs' argument that an injunction should be issued
immediately to end segregation in public schools, instead authoriz-
ing temporary noncompliance while the schools moved toward de-
segregation "with all deliberate speed."203 Even if Romero-Barcelo
can be read only to allow temporary noncompliance, however,
Winter cannot easily be construed this way because the Court not
only overturned the preliminary injunction at issue but also de-
clared that a permanent injunction could not be issued.2 0 More-
over, the type of statutory violation at issue in Winter cannot be
remedied after the violation. The point of NEPA's requirement
that agencies prepare environmental impact statements is to re-
quire that the government look before it leaps; that is, it must con-
sider the environmental impacts of proposed actions before com-
mitting to action.205 An environmental impact statement issued after
the government has already leapt does not serve NEPA's purposes
because it neither contributes to informed governmental decision-
making nor protects the public from environmentally harmful ac-
tions.
2 See Daniel A. Farber, Equitable Discretion, Legal Duties, and Environmental
Injunctions, 45 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 513, 524-25 (1984). Although he recognized that Ro-
mero-Barcelo "is unclear on the critical issue of the extent of equitable discretion,"
Professor Farber construes the case in this narrow fashion as authorizing judicial dis-
cretion only to allow temporary noncompliance. Id. Professor Plater, by contrast, con-
strues the case more broadly as authorizing statutory violations. See Plater, supra
note 27, at 594.
a Brown v. Bd. of Educ. (Brown II), 349 U.S. 294,301 (1955).
a Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 381.
a Robertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 349 (1989) ("Simply
by focusing the agency's attention on the environmental consequences of a proposed
project, NEPA ensures that important effects will not be overlooked or underesti-
mated only to be discovered after resources have been committed or the die other-
wise cast.").
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In declaring that equitable balancing cannot be employed to un-
dermine statutory policies, the Court may mean nothing more than
that balancing cannot be used to express open disagreement with
congressional policies. The Court considered a parallel issue in the
constitutional context in Brown II and subsequent cases that ad-
dressed the scope of available remedies to end school segrega-
tion.2 0 Just as the Court has stated that equitable balancing in
statutory contexts cannot be used to conflict with Congress's ex-
pressed policies, so the Court in Brown II declared that equitable
balancing in constitutional contexts cannot legitimately give any
weight to asserted interests that conflict with the constitutional
rights at stake.2 " As the Court's application of equitable balancing
in statutory contexts shows, however, a prohibition on considering
interests contrary to statutory policies still leaves courts with con-
siderable authority to undermine statutory policies by not taking
them seriously.
C. The Application of Equitable Balancing in Statutory Contexts is
Anomalous in Light of Other Principles of Statutory Construction
The Supreme Court adopted a presumption in favor of equitable
balancing to address a particular statutory ambiguity: Congress
frequently authorizes equitable remedies for statutory violations
without providing any criteria for how courts should exercise that
authority.208 The presumption resolves this ambiguity by establish-
205See Brown II, 349 U.S. at 300.
' Id. at 300-01 (declaring that "it should go without saying that the vitality of these
constitutional principles cannot be allowed to yield simply because of disagreement
with them"). Accordingly, in determining how to alleviate segregation, courts could
legitimately consider various administrative obstacles to desegregation but could not
consider, for instance, public opposition to integration or the supposed educational
benefits of segregation. Id.
'a For instance, Section 11(g)(1) of the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1540(g)(1) (2006), the provision at issue in TVA v. Hill, authorizes any person to
bring suit "to enjoin any person, including the United States and any other govern-
mental instrumentality or agency (to the extent permitted by the eleventh amendment
to the Constitution), who is alleged to be in violation of any provision of this chapter
or regulation issued under the authority thereof" and provides the district courts with
jurisdiction "to enforce any such provision or regulation, or to order the Secretary to
perform such act or duty, as the case may be." The citizen suit provision of the Clean
Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a) (2006), at issue in Romero-Barcelo, employs similar
language in granting the district courts jurisdiction "to enforce" the provision of the
Act and permits issued under the Act. Section 706 of the Administrative Procedure
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ing that courts should employ the supposedly traditional balancing
technique unless clear evidence in the statute demonstrates that
Congress intended to foreclose balancing. The presumption was
adopted based on the principle that statutes ordinarily should be
read to incorporate background legal principles,2" but once it is
recognized that equitable balancing is not a traditional methodol-
ogy for determining whether to grant injunctions, the presumption
in favor of equitable balancing should be recognized as anomalous.
Unlike other doctrines for addressing statutory ambiguities, which
seek to restrain judicial policymaking authority, the presumption in
favor of equitable balancing serves to aggrandize judicial power.
The Court has long recognized that statutory construction in-
volves a substantial amount of policymaking power, and it has
adopted a variety of doctrines for resolving statutory ambiguities
that have as their guiding principle the goal of constraining the
courts' policymaking authority.210 For instance, under the doctrine
announced in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., federal courts defer to administrative agency inter-
pretations of ambiguous statutes, as long as the agency's interpre-
tation is reasonable.211 Chevron serves an important separation-of-
powers function by allocating to democratically accountable execu-
tive agencies, and not courts, the policymaking authority to deter-
mine how ambiguous statutory regimes should be implemented.212
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (2006), provides the courts with authority to enforce the National
Environmental Policy Act, at issue in Winter, providing in seemingly mandatory lan-
guage that "[a] reviewing court shall-(1) compel agency action unlawfully with-
held ... and (2) . . . set aside agency action ... found to be ... without observance of
procedure required by law."
"9 As the Court has declared, "where a common-law principle is well established ...
the courts may take it as given that Congress has legislated with an expectation that
the principle will apply except 'when a statutory purpose to the contrary is evident."'
Astoria Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104, 108 (1991) (quoting Isrand-
sten Co. v. Johnson, 343 U.S. 779, 783 (1982)).
210 See Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103 Harv. L.
Rev. 405, 458-59 (1989) (discussing doctrines adopted by the Supreme Court under
which, "when statutes have ambiguities or leave gaps, discretionary judgments should
be made by the relatively more accountable agency rather than by courts").
2 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
212See John F. Manning, Constitutional Structure and Judicial Deference to Agency
Interpretations of Agency Rules, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 612, 634 (1996) (stating that
Chevron expresses "a constitutional commitment to [federal] policymaking by more,
rather than less, representative institutions"); see also 1 Laurence H. Tribe, American
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The Court has adopted several other presumptions for resolving
statutory ambiguities that likewise seek to limit judicial policymak-
ing power. For instance, the Court has established a presumption
against reading ambiguous statutes to empower federal courts to
create federal common law.213 The Court has explained that federal
courts' power to make federal common law exists only "in the pe-
numbra of express statutory mandates."2 14 Even in these interstitial
areas in which federal courts have authority to fill statutory gaps,
the Court has declared that federal common law should be guided
by congressional policies, not the whims of federal judges.215 Here,
too, the Court fills statutory ambiguity by limiting judicial policy-
making power rather than expanding it.
The debate about judicial reliance on legislative history also il-
lustrates the Court's rejection of broad judicial policymaking to re-
solve statutory ambiguities. On one side, some judges and scholars
argue that courts should consult legislative history when construing
ambiguous statutes because legislative history may provide insight
into the intentions of Congress, thus providing courts with a basis
outside their own preferences for determining the meaning of am-
biguous terms.216 On the other side, textualists argue that legislative
history is too unreliable a source and is too easily manipulated to
provide sufficient authority for resolving ambiguous texts, which
Constitutional Law 994 (3d ed. 2000) (stating that, though the Chevron doctrine "is
not a rule of constitutional law per se,. . . it is nonetheless premised on important
separation-of-powers principles"); id. at 625 ("Chevron embraces the assumption that
if a silent or ambiguous statute leaves an interpreter room to choose among reason-
able alternative understandings, the interpretive choice entails the exercise of sub-
stantial policymaking discretion."); id. at 626 (stating that Chevron "emphasized that
our constitutional system favors relatively more accountable agencies, and not rela-
tively less accountable courts, as repositories of policymaking discretion").
':City of Milwaukee v. Illinois (Milwaukee II), 451 U.S. 304, 317 (1981).
" Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957).
215 United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 440 U.S. 715, 738 (1979) ("[I]n fashioning
federal principles to govern areas left open by Congress, our function is to effectuate
congressional policy."); Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384 U.S. 63, 69 (1966)
("If there is a federal statute dealing with the general subject, it is a prime repository
of federal policy and a starting point for federal common law."). But see Martin H.
Redish, supra note 144, at 766-67 (1989) (arguing that federal common law violates
separation-of-powers principles because it is essentially a legislative task).
1 See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting
Statutes, 65 S. Cal. L. Rev. 845, 848 (1992) ("Using legislative history to help interpret
unclear statutory language seems natural.").
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should instead be resolved through formal rules of textual exege-
sis.217 Although the two sides disagree about the legitimate sources
for resolving statutory ambiguity, both sides agree that courts
should rely on external sources with political legitimacy-either
the statutory text alone or texts read in conjunction with other in-
dications of congressional intent-for making the policy decisions
raised by the construction of ambiguous texts."'
The presumption in favor of equitable balancing points in ex-
actly the opposite direction as these other doctrines adopted to ad-
dress statutory ambiguities. It announces that, when statutes are
ambiguous about how courts should decide whether to enjoin
statutory violations, courts are empowered to make decisions
based on their own ad hoc assessments of the policy interests at
stake. Equitable balancing does not require courts to consult ex-
ternal sources for identifying the relevant interests or the weights
to assign those interests, but instead authorizes courts independ-
ently to weigh the competing values based on their own assess-
ments of the competing policies. Thus, while the Court's usual ap-
proach to resolving ambiguities seeks to constrain judicial
policymaking power, the presumption in favor of equitable balanc-
ing enlarges that power. In this way, too, equitable balancing ag-
grandizes judicial power at the expense of Congress.
III. INSTEAD OF EQUITABLE BALANCING, THE COURT SHOULD
APPLY THE ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES FOR RECONCILING
APPARENTLY CONFLICTING STATUTES
As Parts I and II argued, the application of equitable balancing
in statutory contexts is unsupported by history and conflicts with
separation-of-powers principles. As this Part shows, the Court does
21 See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, A Matter of Interpretation: Federal Courts and the Law
31-37 (1997).
21 Additional principles of statutory construction that the Court has developed for
addressing textual ambiguities include the presumption against construing federal
statutes to preempt state law. Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431, 449
(2005). For the presumption against the creation of federal common law, see Texas
Industries v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981). And for the clear statement
of the rule against construing federal statutes to abrogate state Eleventh Amendment
immunity, see Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238-40 (1985).
Unlike equitable balancing, these principles of statutory construction create relatively
bright-line rules that take policy questions out of courts' hands.
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not need to develop an alternative to equitable balancing for use in
statutory cases because it already has one. The Court has devel-
oped a set of principles for reconciling apparently conflicting statu-
tory commands, and these principles, designed to discern congres-
sional intent through relatively straightforward principles of
statutory construction, would resolve whether to issue injunctions
in cases like Winter without running afoul of separation-of-powers
principles.
The Court addressed Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, Amoco
Production Co. v. Village of Gambell, and Winter as if they merely
involved conflicts between the parties, but these cases are better
understood as arising from apparently conflicting federal com-
mands. For instance, Winter arose because in NEPA Congress di-
rected that federal agencies analyze the potential environmental
impact of proposed actions,'1 while the Secretary of the Navy, act-
ing pursuant to several statutes as well as the President's constitu-
tional power as Commander in Chief, directed that the Navy con-
duct antisubmarine warfare training without first issuing an
environmental impact statement.220 The plaintiffs argued that the
training exercises were required to comply with NEPA, while the
Secretary of the Navy argued that NEPA's environmental impact
statement requirement should be relaxed because the President
had declared an emergency. The other cases in which the Court has
invoked equitable balancing, Romero-Barcelo and Amoco, simi-
larly arose when federal agencies complied with one statutory re-
quirement while neglecting others.22'
In contrast to the Court's approach in these cases, the Court un-
derstood TVA v. Hill as a case arising from a clash of congressional
21 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C) (2006).
220 See U.S. Const. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; 10 U.S.C. § 5062(a) (2006) (directing that the
Navy "shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained
combat incident to operations at sea"); 10 U.S.C. § 5062(d) (2006) (directing that
"[tihe Navy shall develop aircraft, weapons, tactics, technique, organization, and
eipment of naval combat and service elements").
21 In Romero-Barcelo, the Navy engaged in training exercises pursuant to one set of
legal commands, but these commands allegedly conflicted with the Clean Water Act's
prohibition on discharging water pollution without a permit. 456 U.S. 305, 308-09
(1982). In Amoco, the Secretary of the Interior granted oil and gas leases in the Ber-
ing Sea to oil companies under the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, but this alleg-
edly had an adverse effect on hunting and fishing by aboriginals under the Alaska Na-
tional Interest Lands Conservation Act. 480 U.S. 531, 534-36 (1987).
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mandates. The Court sought to determine whether the two con-
gressional commands at issue-build the dam and save the fish-
could be reconciled and, if not, which command should control.
Examining the Endangered Species Act, the Court concluded
Congress had established no exceptions to the requirement that
federal agencies protect endangered species that would apply to
the Tellico Dam project. Nor was there any indication that, in the
statutes authorizing the Tellico Dam, Congress had intended to ex-
empt construction of the dam from the Endangered Species Act.222
Having found that the dam construction would violate the Endan-
gered Species Act and that Congress had provided neither an ap-
plicable exception nor an exemption for the dam project, the Court
concluded that it had no choice but to issue an injunction.223
TVA v. Hill exemplifies the straightforward principles that the
Court has developed for resolving apparent conflicts between stat-
utes. As one writer succinctly put it, courts applying these princi-
ples simply ask, "[i]s there an irreconcilable conflict between the
statutes? If so, the later in time controls to the extent of the actual
conflict."224 In other words, courts first must attempt to harmonize
apparently conflicting statutes. As the Court has stated, "when two
statutes are capable of co-existence, it is the duty of the courts, ab-
sent a clearly expressed congressional intention to the contrary, to
regard each as effective."225 In determining whether statutes can be
reconciled, courts employ ordinary principles of statutory construc-
tion. These principles consider, among other factors, which statute
more specifically addresses the issue raised by the case and
whether either statute contains any indication of an applicable ex-
emption.22 6 Although the Court has adopted a strong presumption
2 Indeed, to the extent that Congress had considered the question, Congress ap-
parently had been under the impression that the snail darters could be relocated, al-
lowing the dam to be built without eliminating the fish. See TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153,
170-71 (1978) (reviewing the legislative history).
23 Id.
224 Bernadette Bollas Genetin, Expressly Repudiating Implied Repeals Analysis: A
New Framework for Resolving Conflicts Between Congressional Statutes and Federal
Rules, 51 Emory L.J. 677, 681 (2002).
2 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551 (1974); see also Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S.
259, 267 (1981) (asserting that the courts should read federal statutes "to give effect to
each if we can do so while preserving their sense and purpose").
22 As the Court has stated:
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that statutes should be construed to be consistent, when two stat-
utes cannot be reconciled, the Court has held that the later-enacted
statute should be read to repeal an earlier statute.22 '
The rules that the Court has developed for addressing apparent
conflicts between statutes are fairly mechanical and do not allow
courts to do the one thing that equitable balancing requires: decide
which statute embodies policies that the court considers more im-
portant. As the Court has declared, "courts are not at liberty to
pick and choose among congressional enactments."m Yet this is
precisely what equitable balancing condones and even requires.
Had the Court in Winter applied the principles for addressing
apparent conflicts between statutes, the Court would have sought
to reconcile the Secretary of the Navy's obligation to train sailors
and NEPA's command to study the environmental impacts of pro-
posed federal actions. The plaintiffs argued that the requirement to
prepare an environmental impact statement before taking action
applies fully to Naval training exercises, while the Navy argued that
NEPA's requirements should be relaxed in the face of a presiden-
tial declaration of an emergency. This presents a straightforward
question of statutory construction. Indeed, the statutory question
of whether NEPA allows the President to exempt national security
activities from the environmental impact statement requirement
was fully briefed to the Court and was the issue that most observ-
It is a basic principle of statutory construction that a statute dealing with a nar-
row, precise, and specific subject is not submerged by a later enacted statute
covering a more generalized spectrum unless the later statute expressly contra-
dicts the original act or unless such a construction is absolutely necessary in or-
der that the words of the later statute shall have any meaning at all.
Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 547-48 (1988) (internal quotations and citations
omitted). These principles date back at least to the time of the Constitution. See The
Federalist No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating that where statutes conflict, a court
should attempt to read the two statutes "so far as they can, by any fair construction,
be reconciled to each other").
.See, e.g., Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 155 (1976) ("Repeal is
to be regarded as implied only if necessary to make the [later enacted law] work, and
even then only to the minimum extent necessary. This is the guiding principle to rec-
onciliation of the two statutory schemes.") (quoting Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373
U.S. 341,357 (1963)).
m Morton, 417 U.S. at 551.
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ers believed the Court would resolve.229 It is also a fairly easy ques-
tion.
There is no obvious conflict between the command to train sail-
ors and the requirement to study the environmental impacts of
proposed federal actions, let alone the sort of irreconcilable con-
flict that would justify a conclusion that the duty to provide mili-
tary training trumps the duties imposed by NEPA. The Navy can
comply with both NEPA and the mandate to train sailors by com-
pleting an environmental impact statement before undertaking
training exercises. Indeed the military routinely prepares environ-
mental impact statements before taking action, including training
exercises.23 o In the absence of a statutory conflict, courts are re-
quired to construe each statute as being fully effective, thus requir-
ing the Navy both to train sailors and to prepare environmental
impact statements for training exercises.231
In Winter, the Navy argued that NEPA authorizes the President
to exempt military activities from NEPA's requirements upon a
declaration of a national emergency, pointing to the text of NEPA,
which requires federal agencies to undertake environmental impact
analysis "to the fullest extent possible."2 32 If the President declares
that a national emergency requires that military training exercises
be conducted without the delay that preparing an environmental
impact statement can entail, the government argued, the Navy
could be said to comply with NEPA "to the fullest extent possible"
if it issues the impact statement after the exercises had already oc-
curred.2 3  The argument for reading NEPA to authorize the Presi-
dent to exempt military activities by declaring a national emer-
gency, however, cannot be squared with text or precedent. Soon
after the passage of NEPA, the Court ruled that the requirement
"
9 See Brief for the Respondents, supra note 4, at 30-35; Brief for the Petitioners,
su ra note 3, at 21-34.
A search of the Department of Defense website, http://www.defense.gov, reveals
several hundred publicly available environmental impact statements, detailing the an-
ticipated environmental impacts of vital national security programs, including the na-
tional missile defense program.
23 See Smith v. Robinson, 468 U.S. 992, 1024 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
("[C]onflicting statutes should be interpreted so as to give effect to each .....
42 U.S.C § 4332 (2006).
. Brief for the Petitioners, supra note 3, at 22-26 (discussing the scope and validity
of 40 C.F.R. § 1506.11, which authorizes the President to declare an "emergency" and
exempt federal actions from NEPA's requirements).
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that agencies undertake environmental impact analysis "to the
fullest extent possible" means that agencies must fully comply with
NEPA and does not support an exemption unless compliance
"would create an irreconcilable and fundamental conflict" with an-
other statutory requirement.m There is no irreconcilable conflict
between the requirement to train sailors and to undertake envi-
ronmental impact analysis, which can be seen from the military's
routine compliance with NEPA.
The text of NEPA does not include an exception for military ac-
tivities.235 NEPA thus contrasts with several other environmental
statutes, which expressly include such an exception or which au-
thorize the President to exempt military or other activities upon a
finding of a national emergency.236 Rather than exempting military
training from NEPA or authorizing the President to exempt train-
ing exercises from NEPA, Congress's practice has been to enact
legislation that exempts particular activities or projects.237 That
a Flint Ridge Dev. Co. v. Scenic Rivers Ass'n of Okla., 426 U.S. 776, 787-88 (1976).
See, e.g., No GWEN Alliance v. Aldridge, 855 F.2d 1380, 1384 (9th Cir. 1988)
("There is no 'national defense' exception to NEPA. ... 'The Navy, just like any fed-
eral agency, must carry out its NEPA mandate 'to the fullest extent possible' . . . even
though the project has serious national security implications."') (quoting Concerned
About Trident v. Rumsfeld, 555 F.2d 817, 823 (D.C. Cir. 1977)); Basel Action Net-
work v. Mari. Admin., 370 F. Supp. 2d 57, 71 (D.D.C. 2005) (holding that NEPA does
not require an environmental impact statement for federal actions taken overseas);
see also Dep't of Defense, Dir. 6050.7, Environmental Effects Abroad of Major De-
partment of Defense Actions 14 (Mar. 31, 1979) (certified current as of Mar. 5, 2004)
(providing that overseas combat activities are not covered by the environmental im-
pact statement requirement).
' See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. § 1533(a)(3)(B)(i) (2006) (exempting Department of Defense
property from the Endangered Species Act's critical habitat provision); 33 U.S.C.
§ 1323(a)(C) (2006) (authorizing the President to exempt certain kinds of water pollu-
tion from the Clean Water Act's requirement upon a finding that an exemption is
"paramount to the interest of the United States"); 42 U.S.C. § 7418(b) (2006) (author-
izing the President to exempt federal sources and facilities from compliance with the
Clean Air Act if it is "in the paramount interest of the United States"). See generally
Stephen Dycus, National Defense and the Environment 16 (Univ. Press of New Eng-
land 1996); Hope Babcock, National Security and Environmental Laws: A Clear and
Present Danger?, 25 Va. Envtl. L.J. 105, 110-20 (2007); Stephen Dycus, Osama's
Submarine: National Security and Environmental Protection After 9/11, 30 Wm. &
Mary Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 1, 11 (2005).
" See, e.g., Fiscal Year 2001 National Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 106-
398, § 317, 114 Stat. 1654, 1654A-57 (2000) (exempting Department of Defense from
preparing environmental impact statement for low-level flight training); 42 U.S.C.
§ 10141(c) (2006) (exempting EPA from NEPA review of criteria for handling spent
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practice would make little sense if NEPA already exempts such ac-
tivities or authorizes the President to exempt them.
The application of equitable balancing in lieu of statutory con-
struction allowed the Court to avoid deciding whether Congress in-
tended to authorize the President to exempt military activities from
the reach of NEPA. Equitable balancing empowered the Court to
excuse the Navy's statutory noncompliance without even consider-
ing whether Congress authorized such an exemption. Yet as the
Court has long held, "[w]here the statute contains no exception,
the courts cannot create one."238 By assuming that the Navy vio-
lated NEPA and still denying an injunction to end that violation,
the Court effectively created the exception that Congress did not
provide. The Court allowed the Navy to violate NEPA because, in
the judgment of five Justices, complying with NEPA's environ-
mental impact statement requirement would cause more harm than
good. 239
Regardless of which side in Winter was correct regarding
whether NEPA authorizes an exception for emergencies, it is ap-
parent that the question can be resolved through the application of
straightforward principles of statutory construction, without any
need to weigh the Navy's interest in training sailors against envi-
ronmentalists' interests in protecting whales. Resolving the reme-
dial question through straightforward principles of statutory con-
struction is more consistent with the traditional role of courts than
naked balancing of competing statutory interests.
Judicial power is kept in check when courts seek to discern and
implement congressional intent rather than implementing their
own policy judgments. Had the Court reached and resolved the
statutory question presented in Winter, Congress could have then
nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste); 43 U.S.C. § 1652(d) (2006) (exempting
construction of Trans-Alaska Pipeline from further NEPA compliance).
.Hyde v. Shine, 199 U.S. 62, 78 (1905); see also Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205,
214 (2007) ("[T]his Court has no authority to create equitable exceptions to jurisdic-
tional requirements . . ."); 50 Am. Jur. Statutes § 432 (1944) ("Where the legislature
has made no exception to the positive terms of a statute, the presumption is that it in-
tended to make none, and it is a general rule of construction that the courts have no
authority to create, and will not create, exceptions to the provisions of a statute not
made by the act itself.").
" See Lisa Lightbody, Case Comment, Winter v. Natural Resource Defense Council,
Inc., 33 Harv. Envtl. L. Rev. 593, 606 (2009) (arguing that Winter "may have created a
de facto national security exception to NEPA and similar statutes").
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evaluated that decision and amended NEPA if it disagreed.2" As it
stands, however, the Court has not decided whether the statute au-
thorizes the President to exempt military activities from NEPA. In-
stead, the Court has granted itself effective authority to exempt ac-
tivities from NEPA as a matter of equity, regardless of what
Congress intended. Statutory construction expresses more respect
for separation of powers than equitable balancing, which aggran-
dizes judicial authority at the expense of political accountability.
CONCLUSION
This Article has sought to debunk the myth that equitable bal-
ancing is an ancient judicial practice, perhaps even an inherent as-
pect of judging. Equitable balancing is a decidedly modern phe-
nomenon that was first employed after the Civil War and that
became accepted in the early part of the twentieth century to give
judges discretion to excuse violations of common law duties when
courts concluded that a doctrine was needed to avoid issuing eco-
nomically inefficient injunctions. The application of equitable bal-
ancing in federal statutory cases is even more recent, dating back
to only 1982. As with the common law adoption of equitable bal-
ancing, the doctrine was embraced in statutory contexts to give
courts discretion to excuse violations of federal statutes when, in a
court's judgment, countervailing policy interests outweigh the in-
terests served by ordering a statutory violation to end.
2 0 This is just what happened after TVA v. Hill, as Congress amended the Endan-
gered Species Act to create a committee authorized to exempt federal projects from
the Act. See 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g) (2006). When the committee opted not to exempt the
Tellico Dam project, Congress acted again, enacting an appropriation rider that spe-
cifically exempted the project from the Endangered Species Act. 125 Cong. Rec.
23,863-72 (1979); Energy and Water Dev. Appropriation Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-
69, 93 Stat. 437, 449-50 (1979). A similar history of congressional response to a fed-
eral injunction occurred with regard to another environmental statute in the course of
litigation over the impact of the Navy's use of sonar on whales. After a lower court
enjoined Naval training exercises for violating the Marine Mammal Protection Act
("MMPA"), Natural Res. Def. Council v. Evans (Evans II), 279 F. Supp. 2d 1129,
1188-91 (N.D. Cal. 2003), Congress amended the MMPA to specify precisely the sort
of impacts on marine mammals that the Navy could and could not take during train-
ing exercise, National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, Pub. L. No.
108-136, § 319(a), 117 Stat. 1392, 1433 (2003) (amending the Marine Mammal Protec-
tion Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1962(18) (2006)).
Equitable Balancing
Once equitable balancing is recognized as a modern phenome-
non adopted to enlarge judicial policymaking authority, it becomes
apparent that applying the doctrine in statutory cases raises sub-
stantial separation-of-powers problems. Those problems are most
acute when a court decides whether to enjoin an executive agency
for violating a federal statute. In that situation, the legitimacy of
actions by all three branches is on the line because the judiciary
must decide whether to order the executive branch to conform to
standards set by legislative branch. A court must be careful to en-
sure that the other branches have acted consistently with their con-
stitutional roles-that Congress did not overstep its authority in
enacting the statute or statutes at issue and that the President has
implemented congressional commands consistently with both his
constitutional and statutory authority. But it is in precisely this
situation that the Supreme Court has embraced equitable balanc-
ing, which throws separation-of-powers concerns to the wind. In-
stead of seeking to discern congressional intent regarding the prior-
ity of federal policies or to defer to either of the political branches'
assessments of competing policies, equitable balancing empowers
courts to decide whether to excuse statutory violations based on a
judge's own assessment of the relative importance of competing
policy interests. The Court's experiment in applying equitable bal-
ancing in statutory cases should be abandoned.
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